On Individual Decision Making and Responsibility for Others by Fornasari, Federico
University of Trento
Doctoral Thesis
On Individual Decision Making
and Responsibility for Others
Author:
Federico Fornasari
Supervisors:
Prof Luigi Mittone
Dr Matteo Ploner
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics and Management
School of Social Sciences
April, 2016

Supervisors
Prof Luigi Mittone
Universita` degli Studi di Trento
Dr Matteo Ploner
Universita` degli Studi di Trento
Evaluation Committee
Dr Antonio Filippin
Universita` degli Studi di Milano
Prof Guido Ortona
Universita` del Piemonte Orientale
“Amedeo Avogadro”
Prof Alessandro Rossi
Universita` degli Studi di Trento
Doctoral Committee
Prof Daniela Teresa Di Cagno
LUISS “Guido Carli”
Prof Alessandro Narduzzo
Libera Universita` di Bolzano
Prof Gabriella Berloffa
Universita` degli Studi di Trento

vUNIVERSITY OF TRENTO
Abstract
School of Social Sciences
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics and Management
On Individual Decision Making
and Responsibility for Others
by Federico Fornasari
Individuals’ concerns for others have been the focus of many experimental
investigations since the first appearance of the dictator game, which pointed
out that, when people have to allocate resources and determine their own and
others’ payoffs, they decide accordingly to some well-defined distributional
preferences. These, depending on the decisional setting and on individuals,
are able to generate discrepancies between decisions that only affect the de-
cision maker and choices that have consequences on others’ payoffs. Starting
from these considerations, the three studies presented in this thesis have the
aim to picture the state of the art in the literature related to decision making
and responsibility for others. Specifically, Chapter 2 presents an overview of
past contributions, providing an analysis of three different experimental litera-
tures: dictator games, delegated decision making under risk, and leadership in
cooperation; the last two are then experimentally investigated more in details
in the following chapters. Specifically, Chapter 3 focuses on investment in
risk protection when risk is borne either by the decision maker or by another
individual. In addition to this, the analysis manipulates who is the subject
providing the resources to buy risk protection. Laboratory observations are
assessed against behavioral predictions obtained from a linear model for social
preferences to test its predictive power in this domain. Chapter 4 drives the
attention to the effect of leadership in a public good experiment. Leaders take
part to a public good game, aware of the fact that every decision they make
directly affects their followers, who can be either passive players or have the
opportunity to send short messages to their leader. This experimental setting
allows to observe how people decide for themselves and others when involved
in strategic interaction.
Keywords: Experimental Economics; Distributional Preferences; Decision Mak-
ing; Delegated Choices; Public Goods; Leadership
JEL-classification: C91; D03; D80; O12; C72; C92; H41; O12
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Introduction
The first appearance of the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994) signed what
can be considered a turning point in the body of literature related to individual
other regarding concerns. Contrarily to the ultimatum game presented by
Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982), where recipients have the last
word in determining final payoffs, the dictator game introduced a design where
subjects assigned the role of dictator can purely express their distributional
preferences.
Since then, many authors have been contributing to enrich knowledge
about dictator games and individual allocation preferences, when they have to
decide for themselves and for others (for an exhaustive review of the literature
see Engel, 2011).
Since then, experimental economists have produced a great variety of con-
tributions to this literature, trying to gradually enlarge the scope and test
other dimensions related to situations where decision makers are not the only
ones affected by the consequences of their choices (i.e. decision makers are re-
sponsible for someone else). Two of the most important domains are delegated
decision making under risk and leadership and cooperation.
Delegated decision making under risk could be defined as a situation where
the decision maker is asked to make a risky choice having consequences on
others’. Taking this as a starting point, it is possible to understand how
delegated decision making can be considered a task that individuals commonly
face many times during their lifetime; it happens frequently, in fact, that we
have the responsibility to decide for others, both in our private and professional
lives. Think, for instance, of parents raising their children, doctors curing
patients, or also financial consultants advising some investors.
The latter example is particularly relevant as behavioral experiments on
delegated decision making have been mainly focused on this dimension, trying
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to analyze how individuals decide for others when investing money. Specifi-
cally, authors have tried to understand if people make different decisions when
investing their own money rather than someone else’s one.
Experimental findings are sparse and contradictory, and point out a com-
plex situation: some studies provide evidence of delegated agents being more
risk averse when deciding for someone else, while other studies suggest that
agents are less risk averse over other people’s money. Nevertheless, contribu-
tions to this literature allow to derive two main evidence: i) people delegated
to invest others’ money show other regarding concerns (Krawczyk and Le Lec,
2010; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015), and ii) delegated agents tend to decide
differently when investing their own money rather than others’.
Leadership and cooperation, on the other hand, represents a different de-
cisional setting: a decision maker is usually appointed as leader of a group
playing a public good game, and has to determine group contributions to the
public good. This simple design can be complicated by the presence of other
factors, such as, for instance, altruistic punishment, or a threshold to reach.
Contrarily to what regards delegated decision making, the great majority
of results in the literature on leadership and cooperation show that, in general,
leadership is able to produce an increase in contributions to the public good
with respect to what observed in the traditional form of the game. This
result is particularly important as it suggests that, when responsible for others,
people tend to be more cooperative and efficiency oriented.
Despite these general findings, delegated decision making under risk and
leadership in cooperation are two growing bodies of literature, and allow fur-
ther tests and explorations. My aim is to create a general framework, collecting
and describing the most relevant studies in the two fields, and to contribute
to the literature presenting two experimental studies.
Chapter 2 presents the state of the art of research made on individual
decision making and responsibility for others: first it provides an overview
of the most important findings about dictator games, following the paper
by Engel (2011); then, the chapter includes a review of relevant studies on
delegated decision making under risk, and leadership and cooperation.
These domains can be considered as independent fields of study, but, at
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the same time, they have in common that decision makers are responsible for
others’ welfare. In fact, in these three experimental settings, participants are
asked to make choices that directly influence the payoffs of the people they are
matched with. This generates a psychological pressure that produces discrep-
ancies in decision making that depend on who is bearing the consequences of
these choices.
Engel (2011) finds that people generally tend to allocate a share of their
endowment to their recipients: this confirms the presence of other regarding
concerns. Nevertheless, the author explains how the domain of allocation
preferences is complex and dependent from the decisional setting.
Similarly, my analysis on delegated decision making suggests that discrep-
ancies across studies could be due to a mix of idiosyncratic experimental fac-
tors, such as the risk preferences elicitation method, individual risk prefer-
ences, or the incentives structure. In line with this, the present analysis also
relies on the approach adopted by Crosetto and Filippin (2015), and provides
a comparative overview of some elicitation tasks.
As for leadership in cooperation, all the articles I have analyzed in my
meta-study show a consistent increase in cooperation when someone is ap-
pointed as leader of the group. Nonetheless, also in this domain, single ex-
perimental factors, such as the group size, the implementation of altruistic
punishment, and the number of rounds, seem to affect cooperation in a signif-
icant way.
Chapter 3 is based on the working paper ’Investment in Risk Protection
and Social Preferences: an Experimental Study ’ (Fornasari, Ploner, and So-
raperra, 2015), and it focuses on delegated decision making under risk. In
this study, participants are divided into couples and assigned either the role
of dictator or recipient.
Dictators are asked to allocate a certain sum to buy risk protection under
two different conditions: when risk is borne by themselves, and when it is
borne by the recipient they are matched with. At the same time, the cost to
offset risk is manipulated, and can be borne by dictators or recipients.
This particular design allows to obtain four different treatments, and to
observe delegated agents’ behavior from two perspective: risk attitudes and
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the use of resources. The first has been already investigated experimentally,
while, at the best of my knowledge, the latter is analyzed within this domain
for the first time.
Subjects’ behavior in the experiment is assessed against predictions derived
from the model for social preferences by Charness and Rabin (2002). Results
show, in line with behavioral predictions, that individuals buying protection
from risk for themselves invest more when using others’ resources rather than
their own.
In addition to this, individuals are willing to invest more of their resources
when buying protection for themselves than for others. Regarding delegated
decisions, subjects asked to decide for others, generally, appear more risk
averse, as they buy more risk protection than when choosing for themselves.
Chapter 4 is based on the working paper ’Tell Me How to Rule: Leadership,
Delegation and Voice in Cooperation’ (Faillo, Fornasari, and Mittone, 2016)
and, following some recent studies, presents an experimental test of the effects
of intra-group leadership in a public good game.
Specifically, participants play a public good game that has the same struc-
ture of the one implemented by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), but are randomly
assigned either the role of leader or the role of follower. Leaders take part in
the game, aware of the fact that every decision they make directly affects their
followers.
From this point of view, the experimental setting combines the dimension
of leadership in cooperation with the one of delegated agents, and, for the first
time, adds the dimension of cooperation between leaders of different groups.
In fact, previous studies have been focusing only on how leadership affects
intra-group cooperation.
Results show that leadership produces two main effects: subjects con-
tribute more, and tend to punish more frequently. However, in spite of the
presence of higher contributions, the implementation of leadership lowers final
payoffs. This seems to be due to the aggressive behavior that leaders exhibit:
responsibility for others leads them to an undue use of punishment.
Allowing one-way communication from followers to leaders, it is possible
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to observe a change in leaders’ behavior: communication reduces their aggres-
siveness, leading to lower average contributions, yet, at the same time, to a
reduction in punishment. This results in higher average payoffs. In addition, it
is interesting to notice how payoffs under the communication condition do not
statistically differ from the ones obtained when leadership is not implemented
at all. This suggests that the presence of a dictatorial leader in public goods
with punishment can be beneficial only when there is a democratic approach
that allows communication.
Chapter 5, finally, presents the concluding remarks of the thesis and pro-
vides an overview of the main results obtained. It also explains what could
be the most important implications, and limitations of the findings presented,
suggesting some further studies that could be considered to contribute to the
literature.
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Responsibility for Others in
Allocation Tasks:
An Analysis
2.1 Introduction
Past studies have widely documented how individuals show allocation pref-
erences even in simple economic choices involving other individuals. Testing
and analyzing such preferences, many scholars have provided a fundamental
turning point: Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) undoubtedly need
to be cited among these. For the first time, the authors implemented an allo-
cation game able to capture individual’s preferences in terms of self and others’
payoffs: the ultimatum game.
Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) divided subjects into couples
and assigned them either the role of donor or recipient, letting dictators decide
how to split a sum of money; recipient could accept and end the game with
the allocation chosen by the donor, or reject and end the game with zero
payoffs for both. The authors found that people are characterized by certain
defined preferences able to affect their decisional process, at the point that
recipients prefer to turn down a rationally acceptable economic offer, if they
do not consider it fair. Donors, on the other hand, are not free to advance
purely selfish offers as they anticipate the psychological and monetary cost of
a possible rejection.
In order to observe individuals’ allocation preferences and to explore in a
deeper way the concept of fairness, as this emerged from Guth et al’s study,
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) implemented a modified version of
the ultimatum game, finding that individuals were willing to give up part of
their own earning to generate a more fair general outcome.
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Few years later, Forsythe et al. (1994) questioned the identification of
fairness as the main determinant of people’s choices. The authors analyzed
subjects’ decisions, drawing a comparison between an ultimatum game and a
dictator game. The two games have similar settings; however, in the dictator
game recipients do not have any power, and thus the game always ends ac-
cordingly to dictators’ choices. Forsythe et al. found that fairness is not the
unique key to interpret dictators’ offers, as these varied from one game to the
other.
This and other findings set the ground for following studies, aimed to
explain individuals’ allocation preferences, and to develop models able to de-
scribe and predict people’s behavior. These are known as models for social
preferences. Many authors contributed to this literature, some focusing on
the role of individuals’ intentions and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), others assuming altruis-
tic motives (Andreoni and Miller, 1996; Levine, 1998), and others introducing
the concept of inequity aversion.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), belonging to the latter group, developed a model
following previous theories about altruistic behavior, and added a strategic
component built on individuals’ preferences for equity outcomes. Specifically,
the authors were able to explain how people tend to constantly drive compar-
isons between their own wealth and their peers’ one.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) developed a similar model: they argued that
people’s choices are, as defined by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), justified by their
own payoffs and their relative standing, but specify that the latter as to be
compared to the average payoff, instead of driving one-to-one comparisons
with all the other individuals involved. Furthermore, the authors assume that
people do not derive any utility when applying small deviations from an equal
distribution. This assumption is particularly relevant as it justifies non-equal
splits in allocation games (e.g. the ultimatum game).
Charness and Rabin (2002) obtained additional experimental data to test
people’s concerns for others in allocation experiments, and built a new model
for social preferences. Comparing their data with previous models, the authors
realized that inequity aversion could not capture all the decisions observed
experimentally. Thus, they found necessary to classify individuals depending
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on their allocation, and social, preferences into a greater number of categories:
selfish, spite, inequity averse, and welfare enhancing.
Once clear the relevant role of social preferences, more experimental studies
tried to shed new light on individuals’ decision making involving other regard-
ing concerns. In the past, these mainly focused on people’s interactions with
purely deterministic outcomes. Recently, the analysis of social preferences
has been extended to decision-making under risk, cooperation and delegated
agents (defined as risky decision-making with consequences on others’ welfare).
This work aims to combine findings from independent studies involving
allocation games and delegated agents. To this purpose, I first discuss the
results gathered and analyzed by Engel (2011), who provides a complete and
exhaustive study about dictator games experiments. Despite they do not
directly refer to the field of delegated decision-making, I included them in
my analysis because of the similarity between dictator games and delegation.
They only differ with respect to the nature of final payoffs, which are, in the
case of dictator games, deterministic.
Then, I present two analyses: one based on experimental studies on dele-
gated decision making under risk, and one focused on leadership and cooper-
ation in public good experiments. My main purpose is to point out the most
relevant findings, and to identify the common patterns underlying people’s
choices in these two domains. Subsequently, I draw general conclusions on
delegated decision-making, integrating my results with those obtained by En-
gel (2011).
2.2 Dictator Games
Engel (2011) provides an exhaustive and rich analysis of all the studies on dic-
tator games the author was able to find (for similar studies see Camerer, 2003;
Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). Engel gathered data from 131 papers, for a
total of 616 treatments, including both published and unpublished works1.
He only excluded from his analysis studies where recipients had any sort of
power, or any possibility to communicate with the dictator. This was made
1As Engel explains, this was made with the intent to prevent the publication bias, pre-
sented by Thompson and Pocock (1991).
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in an attempt to focus on the original structure of the game and its features;
any psychological effect derived from recipients’ power could have, indeed,
influenced dictators’ pure allocation preferences.
As reported by the author, such a large body of literature aims to test many
different manipulations under the most diverse conditions. This suggests that
the dataset had to be managed taking into account its heterogeneity. What
makes Engel’s work particularly important is, in addition to the large number
of experiments he managed to collect, the fact that he was almost always able
to obtain the standard errors. This allowed him to use a much more precise
econometric model (Harbord and Higgins, 2008), distinguishing his work from
most of the other meta-analyses that are based on the number of observations
per study, rather than data distribution.
The first result reported by Engel explains that dictators share, on aver-
age, 28.35% of their endowment with the recipients they are matched with.
Furthermore, the left skewed distribution of offers suggests, as already pointed
out byCamerer (2003), that dictators tend to give small shares2. Additional
results, describing different distributional preferences, are derived from the
dataset with individual observations that Engel reconstructed: 36.11% of the
offers were equal to zero, 16.74% equally divided the endowment, and 5.44%
transferred everything to the recipient.
In order to provide additional details, Engel presents an analysis of the
explanatory factors involved in the studies forming his dataset. As the num-
ber of different manipulations in the sample is large, it is possible to identify
many diverse independent variables. What emerges is that some have a cer-
tain relevance when considered at a single experiment level, but their effect
is much less significant (if not at all) in the full meta-analysis dataset. In
particular, the author focuses on manipulations concerning incentives, social
control, distributive concerns, framing, social distance, and demographics.
Among the factors influencing dictators’ offers, Engel indicates some that
are significant across all the studies. Offers are higher when the recipient is
deserving, when there is more than one recipient, or dictators are old. Further-
more, when dictators’ identities are disclosed, social pressure increases offers.
2In 6 out of the 616 treatments the average is equal to zero.
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Similarly, dictators are more willing to give when the money sent to the re-
cipient is multiplied. Engel specifies that under these conditions, dictators do
not advance generous offers, but they show a more positive attitude towards
giving: they give little, but more than zero.
On the other hand, Engel also finds factors negatively affecting dictators’
willingness to give. When, for instance, dictators earn their own endowment
they are more reluctant to give: it frequently happens that they offer zero.
Also, dictators give little when recipients already own an endowment, or when
a concealment option is available. Other relevant factors are repeated decisions
and group decisions. While the former can be justified by hypothesizing that
dictators perceive these repeated offers as continuous losses, the latter finds an
explanation in the relief of social pressure due to the presence of other decision
makers. In this sense, a solitary dictator may feel bad in giving little, or not
giving at all; nevertheless, when the decision is shared, even low offers become
socially acceptable.
Engel concludes his analysis explaining how, in spite of the number of
contributions, the literature on dictator games is still growing. Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), and subsequently Forsythe et al. (1994), proved
that the classical definition of homo oeconomicus does not provide the right
basis to build decisional models. Individuals have utility functions involving
distributional preferences that are much more complex than the simple as-
sumptions of selfishness and income maximization. From that moment on,
thanks to its simple structure, the dictator game allowed many researchers
to investigate an incredibly large number of different novel aspects from both
an economic and psychological point of view. All these contributions have
irreversibly changed the approach to the study of the individual decisional
process, underlining the importance of people’s concerns for others. More re-
cently, authors have driven their attention to related studies that still focus on
distributional preferences, but are characterized by a more complicated struc-
ture and by indeterministic outcomes.
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2.3 Delegated Decision Making Under Risk
In a pioneer study Binswanger (1980) proves that subjects taking part to
experiments show certain attitudes towards risk. Since then, many authors
have contributed to this field proposing diverse methods to elicit individuals’
risk preferences. Andersen et al. (2006) bring evidence of the fact that subjects
are, in laboratory experiments, generally risk averse.
More recently, authors have started focusing on how these risk attitudes in-
teract with people’s distributional preferences (Trautmann and Vieider, 2011).
In particular, they aim to understand whether people make different choices
for others (i.e. when they are delegated agents) with respect to what they de-
cide for themselves, and whether these choices can be attributed to individual
social preferences. Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) find evidence of individu-
als’ efficiency concerns, while Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) provide results
that appear to be equity oriented. Although these studies have different ap-
proaches, the influence of social preferences on subjects’ choices seems to be
relevant.
Other studies contributed, more generally, to the analysis of delegate de-
cision making, leaving aside the aspects related to social preferences. Some
authors (Andersson et al., 2014; Chakravarty et al., 2011) find that agents are
more risk averse over their own money rather than when asked to invest oth-
ers’ one; Agranov, Bisin, and Schotter (2014) define this as the Other People’s
Money Effect. At the same time, other studies (Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider,
2015; Eriksen and Kvaløy, 2014) find evidence of the opposite: i.e. individuals
are more risk averse when managing others’ money than their own.
One of the main causes of the discrepancies emerged in the literature on
self and delegated decision making under risk, could be the risk elicitation
method used; in fact, as pointed out by Crosetto and Filippin (2015), different
elicitation procedures can generate diverse measures of risk preferences within
subjects. Following, I describe the most common risk elicitation tasks found
in this body of literature, and the results of the studies on delegated agents
related to them.
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2.3.1 Risk Elicitation and Delegated Decision Making
For this analysis of the literature about delegated agents, I collected 10 ex-
periments, including both published and unpublished works.3 Other studies,
f.i. Polman (2012), drive the attention on self and delegated decision making,
mainly focusing on loss aversion; thus, although their contribution is relevant
to the field, they do not specifically fit my analysis.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the studies I analyze, specifying for each
the risk elicitation method utilized during the original experiment.
Table 2.1: Experiments and Elicitation Methods
Experiment Elicitation Method
Agranov, Bisin, and Schotter (2014) Custom
Andersson et al. (2014) MPL
Bolton, Ockenfels, and Stauf (2015) MPL
Chakravarty et al. (2011) MPL
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2014) GP
Fornasari, Ploner, and Soraperra (2015) BDM
Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan (2015) GP
Gu¨th, Levati, and Ploner (2008) BDM
Hsee and Weber (1997) Custom
Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2015) Custom
BDM: Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), GP: Gneezy and
Potters (1997), MPL: Multiple Price List.
Multiple Price List (MPL)
The most widely known version of the MPL procedure was presented by Holt
and Laury (2002). Subjects are presented a list of dichotomous choices between
lotteries with increasing expected value: lotteries are organized into pairs,
where one lottery is safer than the other. For each pair, subjects have to choose
one of the lotteries; at a certain point of the list, subjects with monotonic
preferences switch from the safer option to the riskier one, revealing their risk
preferences. Nevertheless, some individuals present inconsistent behaviors,
showing multiple switching points: in order to analyze these observations, it
is required the use of a stochastic decision model.
3The studies I consider here allow to be compared from a methodological point of view,
and they all include tests of self and delegated decision making under risk.
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One of the study on delegated decision making using the HL procedure4
is Bolton, Ockenfels, and Stauf (2015). The authors presented 5 different
treatments, all involving risk taking in social context: the social risk dimension
was manipulated in a between subjects fashion, and payoffs could be either
perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated. In the former case,
payoffs of players belonging to the same couple are identical; in the latter,
one of the two players receive the high payoff and the other the low payoff
of the selected lottery. Furthermore, the authors added a test on delegated
agents’ choices: in two treatments, they are informed about their peer’s risk
preferences. Bolton, Ockenfels, and Stauf (2015) found that payoffs correlation
does not generate statistically significant differences, but responsibility for
others individuals increases risk aversion. Without information about others’
risk preferences, the average number of safe choices is equal to 5.56 (sd 1.58)
for self decision making and to 5.92 (sd 1.46) for delegated choices. With
information, the average number of safe choices is equal to 5.94 (sd 1.48) for
self decision making and to 6.68 (sd 1.36) for delegated decision making.
Another contribution using the same elicitation method is provided by
Chakravarty et al. (2011). The authors tested in a within subjects fashion the
effect of responsibility for others, adding a control for the order effect, and
found that delegated agents are less risk averse over others’ money. Results
show that the average number of safe choices is equal to 6.35 (sd 1.65) for
individual choices and to 5.03 (sd 1.79) for delegated choices.
Andersson et al. (2014) implemented an experiment testing four different
treatments. Under the individual condition subjects were asked to decide for
themselves and got paid accordingly, while under the other condition their
decisions determined someone else’s payoff. In order to drive a meaningful
comparison between these two treatments, the authors introduced the condi-
tions hypothetical, where subjects’ monetary incentives are removed, and both,
where monetary consequences for both subjects are involved at the same time.
The task, as reported by the authors, involved four MPLs: two with gains and
two with losses. Each MPL was composed of 10 binary choices between lotter-
ies: the safe lottery was constant, the risky lottery had increasing payoff, and
4The authors modified the original payoff structure, tripling the values of lotteries and
converting them into Euro currency.
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probability was always equal to 50%. Experimental results in terms of average
number of safe choices over two lists are summarized in the table below.
Treatment Gains Losses
individual 10.5 10.7
other 10.5 9.8
hypothetical 10.5 9.3
both 10.5 9.8
In general, results suggest that in the domain of gains there is no difference
across treatments. When there are losses, delegated choices are made with a
lower risk aversion with respect to individual choices. Authors claimed that
this decrease in risk aversion derives from a decrease in the loss aversion in
delegated decision making.
The Investment Game (GP)
Gneezy and Potters (1997) were the first to present this procedure, where
subjects are asked to express their preferences over an investment decision.
They receive an endowment and can decide how much of it they want to
allocate to a risky investment: the lottery pays back 250% of the invested
amount with probability 1/3, while the investment is lost with probability
2/3.
Following this procedure, Eriksen and Kvaløy (2014) presented an experi-
ment based on a 2 (own v other) x 2 (frequent v infriquent) treatments matrix.
One manipulation is related to the person affected by the choices made during
the task, while the other is related to the frequency of feedback about previ-
ous decisions and aims to investigate myopic loss aversion. The task included
9 sequential independent investment decisions: in every round the decision
maker received an endowment equal to 100 ECU and was asked to decide the
amount k to invest in the risky prospect. The average amount invested in the
risky prospect is equal to:
Treatment Frequent Infrequent
own 49.2 59.1
other 46.7 51.7
Subjects appear affected by myopic loss aversion: they take systematically
less risk when the evaluation is frequent under both conditions own and other.
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Regarding delegated decision making, investors show a greater risk aversion
over others’ money than over their own.
Another experiment based on the same task was presented by Fu¨llbrunn
and Luhan (2015). In the first treatment (own) individuals were asked to
decide how much to invest from an endowment of 9 Euros. The second treat-
ment (other) asked the decision maker to act as money manager for six passive
players: they were endowed with 9 Euros each and the money manager, who
didn’t get paid, had to decide a unique investment value for all of them. The
last treatment (lea) was equal to the previous one, but players’ incentives were
aligned. Treatments were applied in a within subjects fashion and produced
the following results: the average investment was equal to 4.6 Euros in the
treatment own, 3.9 in the treatment other, and 4.0 in the treatment lea.
Others’ money was managed with an higher risk aversion, and this is true
also when the money manager’s incentives are aligned to the investors’ ones.
The study by Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan (2015) is important also because intro-
duced the dimension of the group investment, making the delegated agents
decide for more people at the same time, and increasing the sense of respon-
sibility.
A small comparison
Elicitation methods produce diverse measures, since they differ according to
precision, completeness of choices, and the presence of a safe option, for in-
stance. In fact, following the procedure adopted by Crosetto and Filippin
(2015), it is possible to convert data into a common scale, and to see how dif-
ferently HL and GP map choices into a common parameter r, which represents
the coefficient of a relative risk aversion utility function U(x) = xr.5
Each of the two tasks has been parametrized on 10 choices: HL already
classifies risk preferences in 10 different categories, depending on the number
of risky choices made by the decision maker; according to the proportion of the
endowment invested in the risky prospect, it is possible to identify the same
number of categories for risk aversion elicited by means of the GP procedure.
5A similar exercise can be also found in Harrison and Rutstrom (2008).
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Table 2.2 presents a comparison between risk preferences elicited across
studies using the procedure by HL and GP.6 For each treatment I report
average choices and the corresponding risk coefficient.7
Table 2.2: Risk Preferences Across Elicitation Methods
Experiment Task Choice Set self other leader r self r other r leader
Bolton, Ockenfels, and Stauf (2015)
info HL [0; 10] 4.06 3.72 - 0.47 0.37 -
no info HL [0; 10] 4.44 4.08 - 0.58 0.48 -
Chakravarty et al. (2011) HL [0; 10] 3.65 4.97 - 0.35 0.72 -
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2014) GP [0; 100] 49.16 46.66 - 0.68 0.66 -
Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan (2015) GP [0; 9] 4.55 3.90 3.98 0.69 0.66 0.66
From the literature
HL [0; 10] 4.37 - - 0.60 - -
GP [0; 4] 2.23 - - 0.70 - -
Bolton, Ockenfels, and Stauf (2015) (treatment no info), Eriksen and
Kvaløy (2014), and Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan (2015) show a common increase
in risk aversion when responsibility for others is involved. Furthermore, trans-
lated risk preferences for individual risky choices are in line with the litera-
ture8: a rough comparison confirms that, when the GP procedure is adopted,
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than when preferences are
elicited using the HL task; this seems to be true for both individual and del-
egated decision making. However, as pointed out by Crosetto and Filippin
(2015), this difference might be due to a number of reasons, related to the
features of tasks themsleves.
In a similar manner, Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan (2015) report an increase in risk
aversion in case of delegation; in addition, the implementation of incentives
alignment does not produce significant effects on the extent of risk-taking
observed in self and delegated decision making.
More in general, estimations obtained using the GP method produce re-
sults that are similar across experiments. In contrast, Chakravarty et al. (2011)
report that subjects decide with a lower risk aversion over others’ money with
6Although the elicitation method used is a MPL, I exclude Andersson et al. (2014) because
data reported in the article do not provide sufficient details to estimate the risk parameter
r.
7The papers considered in the analysis do not provide details about median choices; for
this reason, risk coefficients are computed relying on average values. To increase the precision
of this comparison, I considered the approximated mean value of the estimated rs.
8Results from the literature corresponds to the ones reported by Crosetto and Filippin
(2015).
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respect to what done with their own. This difference from the findings re-
ported by Bolton, Ockenfels, and Stauf (2015), could emerge from a different
experimental feature: Chakravarty et al. (2011) implemented a payoff struc-
ture where decision makers and others’ incentives are not aligned, while they
are in Bolton, Ockenfels, and Stauf (2015). Furthermore, it is important to
note that the average number of risky choices found by Chakravarty et al.
(2011) is remarkably lower if compared to the average emerged from the liter-
ature; this must be taken into account as a possible determinant of the strong
decrease in risk aversion observed in delegated choices.
Becker-DeGrot-Marschak (BDM)
The BDM procedure, named after the author who introduced it (Becker, De-
Groot, and Marschak, 1964), asks subjects to express the minimum selling
price they would accept to sell a risky lottery they are endowed with. Then,
a random number between the lowest and the highest value of the lottery is
drawn: if this is equal to ora greater than the stated price, subjects receive
an amount equal to the drawn number; if the drawn number is lower than the
stated price, subjects fail to sell the lottery and play it to determine their final
payment.
In Gu¨th, Levati, and Ploner (2008) subjects were asked to evaluate prospects
including a sure option and a lottery, that could determine their own payoff
together with the one of a subject they were paired with. Each prospect con-
sisted of a risky lottery paying 38 ECU or 16 ECU with equal probability, and
a sure value equal to 27 ECU. Depending on the treatment, the risky lottery
was assigned to the decision maker (own), to the passive partner (other), or to
both (both parties). Decision makers had to express a minimum selling price
for each prospect: this could range from 8 ECU to 46 ECU. The elicitation
of the certain equivalent took place by means of a BDM procedure: if this
was successful, the prospect was sold and the passive partner didn’t get paid;
in the other case, the prospect was not sold and payoffs were determined by
playing it out.
The authors observed differences across treatments: when the risk was
borne by the passive partner, the average bid placed by the decision maker
was equal to 29.9, while when risk was borne by the decision maker the average
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is 28.3; when risk is borne by both parties, the average bid is equal to 28.4.
As one can see at a first sight, average bids are very close to risk-neutrality
(the expected value of the lottery is equal to 27 ECU). However, Gu¨th, Le-
vati, and Ploner (2008) provided also a detailed analysis of individual types:
they observed that the majority of subjects are risk averse (the difference in
reservation prices between the prospect involving no risk and the prospect in-
volving risk only for the decision-maker is positive). Similarly, they considered
subjects’ preferences for social allocation of risky prospects: specifically, for
every subject, they computed the difference in reservation prices between the
prospect involving risk only for the decision-maker and the one involving risk
for the passive partner. Combining individual risk attitudes and social risk
orientation, a risk-averse participant who prefers the prospect including risk
for herself rather than for the other can be considered as other-oriented with
respect to risk: 22 out of 32 subjects evaluated more a prospect including
risk only for themselves than one including risk only for the partner. With
this respect, Gu¨th, Levati, and Ploner (2008) found a strong positive corre-
lation between risk aversion and social orientation: this seems to imply that
delegated choices are made with a lower risk aversion when incentives are
not aligned. However, Gu¨th, Levati, and Ploner (2008) did not observe any
significant difference with aligned incentives.
Using the same elicitation method, Fornasari, Ploner, and Soraperra (2015)
presented an experiment on investments in risk protection aimed to investigate
two aspects: the subject bearing the risk of an uncertain payoff (self v other),
that could assume an integer value between 8 and 12 with equal probability,
and the subject paying to buy risk protection (self v other). The treatments
related to cost were applied between subjects, while those related to risk were
applied within subjects.
The decision maker, who was paired with another individual, was asked to
bid to avoid risk when this was borne by himself or the player he was paired
with. The outcome of the bid was determine following a BDM procedure and,
depending on the treatment, the cost was borne either by the decision maker
or by his peer. Bids could range from 0 to 6 Euros: the average bid placed by
decision makers when they borne the risk and paid for protection was equal
to 1.78, while when their peer borne the risk and was charged the cost of
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protection was equal to 2.47.
Custom
In this section, I include studies using elicitation method that could not be
categorized in the procedures listed above, even if these present some common
features. For instance, Hsee and Weber (1997) and Pahlke, Strasser, and
Vieider (2015) refer to the concept of certain equivalent for the elicitation of
risk, yet without employing a BDM procedure.
Specifically, Hsee and Weber (1997) investigated discrepancies across self
and delegated decision making by implementing different tests. The first is
based on a 2 (self v other) x 2 (gain v loss) x 2 (large v small payoffs)
treatments structure. The task was base on a set of seven pairs of lotteries,
each including a sure amount and a risky option. In the treatment gain with
large payoffs the risky lottery gave 2000$ or 0$ with probability 50%, while
the sure option ranged from 200$ to 1600$ with a step of 200$; absolute values
of payoffs are equal under both the gain and loss conditions, while under the
small payoff conditions they were equal to 1/20 of the corresponding payoffs
under the large condition. Results, in terms of the average switching point
from the risky option to the sure one, are reported below.
Domain Payoffs Self Other
Gain Large 2.5 3.5
Loss Large 3.6 4.5
Gain Small 3.9 4.6
Loss Small 3.6 4.2
The general tendency in this first test seems to be for delegated agents to
decide with lower risk aversion over others’ money with respect to what they
decide over their own.
Another of the tests presented by Hsee and Weber (1997) employed a 3 (self
v next person v others on campus) x 2 (gain v loss) treatments structure. In
this case, the set included 9 choices between a sure amount or a risky lottery.
The latter paid 5000$ or 0$ with probability 50%, while the sure amount
ranged from 500$ to 4500$ with a step of 500$. The six treatments produced
the following results:
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Domain Self Next Person Others on campus
Gain 2.0 1.9 2.5
Loss 4.0 4.4 4.9
Based on this test, the authors were able to introduce a distinction between
the abstraction and the vividness of the person delegated agents are asked to
decide for.
Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2015) tested the effect of responsibility in
delegated decision making with two treatments: in the individual treatment
subjects determined their own payoff, and in the responsibility treatment they
had to determine their own payoff and the one of an unknown subjects within
the lab. Each subject was asked to evaluate 8 pairs of options: 7 including a
sure amount and a 50-50 risky lottery, and one including a 50-50 safe lottery
and a 50-50 risky lottery.
The authors found that delegated choices are made with more risk aversion
in the gains domain; in fact, in the treatment individual the average percentage
of safe choices was equal to 66.6%, and to 72.7% in the treatment responsibility.
The loss domain showed an inverse tendency, with a value of 63.0% for the
individual and 58.6% for the responsibility. No difference was observed in the
mixed prospects.
Agranov, Bisin, and Schotter (2014) implemented a different design, using
safe and risky lotteries into an investment framework to elicit individuals’
risk preferences. Subjects were assigned either the role of investors or money
managers, whose returns depended on the decisions made over their money
(own money) or the investors’ one (risk sharing). The task included 20 choices
between a risky prospect paying 0 tokens or 10 tokens with probability 0.5,
and a safe prospect paying 0 tokens or 7 tokens with probability 0.1 and 0.9,
respectively. In the treatment own money, all players had to choose which
lottery they prefer to play to determine their own payoffs; in the treatment
risk sharing, subjects assigned the role of money manager competed in couples,
offering a share of their earnings, to obtain one investor’s trust to choose
a lottery determining both the investor and the selected money manager’s
payoffs.
Subjects appeared less risk averse when investing others’ money rather
than their own. In particular, the average percentage of safe choices in the
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treatment own money was equal to 21.5%, while in the risk sharing this was
equal to 39.2%.
2.3.2 Discussion
The previous section presented some of the contributions to the body of liter-
ature on delegated decision making under risk, specifying what risk elicitation
method was implemented during the experiment. As explained, these can
be one of the main reasons why discrepancies across studies in this field are
observed; in fact, if some authors observe a lower risk aversion in delegated
decision making, others provide evidence of delegated agents investing others’
money with a greater risk aversion with respect to how they invest their own.
Trying to summarize the experiments analyzed, I observe that studies
based on the MPL elicitation method provide different results: Bolton, Ock-
enfels, and Stauf (2015) find that risk aversion is greater when subjects decide
for others, while Chakravarty et al. (2011) present evidence of the opposite.
With this respect, it is worth noticing that the analysis of the coefficient of
relative risk aversion reveals an undeniable difference between average risk-
taking from the literature, and the one reported by Chakravarty et al. (2011).
Finally, Andersson et al. (2014) report no difference between self and dele-
gated choices in the domain of gains, but they find a lower risk aversion when
subjects decide for others in the domain of losses.
Given the small number of studies on delegated decision-making adopt-
ing the HL task, it is not possible to draw clear conclusions. This procedure
presents relevant advantages, since it allows to capture the whole range of risk
preferences, and it does not include an actual safe option (Crosetto and Filip-
pin, 2015); therefore, it would be useful to test experimentally the robustness
of a shift in risk preferences in self-other decision-making, relying on this pro-
cedure. However, it is also true that this elicitation method suffers from a lack
of precision, generated by the fact that risk preferences cannot be categorized
continuously.
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2014) and Fu¨llbrunn and Luhan (2015) provide their
contribution eliciting risk preferences through the GP method: both stud-
ies find that delegated agents show a greater risk aversion when deciding for
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others. Thus, the GP seems to produce consistent results in this type of ex-
periments, even if it needs to be considered that this procedure might induce
loss aversion, and allows to capture only risk aversion. These results are con-
sistent also if qualitatively compared to the ones obtained in studies where
risk is elicited by a BDM mechanism: Fornasari, Ploner, and Soraperra (2015)
and Gu¨th, Levati, and Ploner (2008) support findings suggesting that dele-
gated agents invest other people’s money with greater risk aversion. However,
I am aware that a detailed comparison across procedures needs to take into
account the idiosyncratic features of each task: in these specific experiments,
the average bids show risk aversion, but, in general, unlike the GP task, the
BDM procedure is able to capture the whole range of risk preferences.
Regarding the three experiments I do not classify, Agranov, Bisin, and
Schotter (2014) and Hsee and Weber (1997) both provide evidence of the fact
that individuals are less risk averse when delegated to make risky choices rather
than when deciding for themselves. On the other hand, Pahlke, Strasser, and
Vieider (2015) find, distinguishing between gains and losses, that delegated
choices are made with more risk aversion in the former domain and lower risk
aversion in the latter domain.
In general, this analysis suggests that subjects, when asked to make deci-
sions over others’ money, show a greater risk aversion than when they decide
over their own money. Results obtained with elicitation methods other than
BDM and GP appear not consistent, yet, they produce an interesting insight:
when focusing on the domain of losses9, delegated agents seem to be less risk
averse over others’ money.
2.4 Leadership in Cooperation
Delegate decision making can be considered, from a psychological point of
view, as an expression of the social pressure one experiences when deciding over
someone else’s wealth. This idea can be generalized and extended to a wider
dimension, involving individuals’ choices consequences on the collectivity, and
analyzing how people behave when they are asked to cooperate in a public good
9I refer to the experiment conducted by Andersson et al. (2014), Hsee and Weber (1997),
and Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2015).
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dilemma, but also how people decide when they are responsible for a common
good.
Cooperation in social dilemmas has been the focus of many studies in the
past, ranging over different domains (Dawes, 1980, Stroebe and Frey, 1982,
Messick and Brewer, 1983, Van Lange et al., 1992, Komorita and Parks, 1994,
Wilson and Wilson, 2007); one of the most relevant contributions is provided
by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), who applied game theory to political science,
in order to identify the benefits of cooperation in iterated prisoner dilemmas,
both from a psychological and economic point of view. Authors found that,
contrarily to grounded rational expectations, individuals show a certain will-
ingness to contribute to public goods. Nevertheless, when the game is repeated
for a finite number of rounds, people decrease contribution, showing free-riding
behaviors while the end of the game is approaching. In particular, subjects
usually contribute with an amount between 40 and 60% of their entire endow-
ment during the first rounds of the game, and 0 in the final rounds, so that
the overall average contribution across rounds is more or less equal to the 20%
of the total endowment.
This phenomenon, known as end-game effect, can be partially limited by
introducing the possibility for subjects to punish free-riders and low contrib-
utors; in fact, as documented by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), when punishment
is allowed, the contribution pattern is in general more constant across rounds.
Furthermore, the use of punishment increases and sustains cooperation in pub-
lic good games, leading to a higher overall average contribution, which is, more
or less, equal to 50% of the endowment.
Reviews on public good games (Zelmer, 2003; Chaudhuri, 2011) can pro-
vide a good overview of all the different factors many authors tested: some of
them are more related to the social dimension, others to the monetary incen-
tives. Recent experiments have combined these two groups of factors, trying
to understand how delegate decision making, under the form of leadership,
affect individuals’ decisions in intra-groups public good experiments.
These experiments produce evidence of the positive effects of leadership in
public good games, suggesting that it is generally beneficial in terms of effi-
ciency to have centralized decisional power in coordination games. Following,
I analyze some of these studies, providing general results and presenting a
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general objective analysis of the literature.
2.4.1 Dataset
In this section, I consider 6 different articles, and a total of 12 studies on lead-
ership in public good experiments (see table 2.3. The number of publications
aimed to investigate leadership in public goods is much greater: the ones I use
are all suitable in terms of design and aim of the investigation, and allow to
perform some general analyses. Other studies are compatible with my inves-
tigation but do not include common variables needed (among these Hamman,
Weber, and Woon, 2011, that only includes contributions under leadership
and not without) for a direct comparisons.
Table 2.3: Studies and Treatments
Article Treatment Label
Gu¨th et al. (2007) Fixed Leader GFL
Random Leader GRL
Bolle and Vogel (2011) Random BR
Election BE
Faillo, Fornasari, and Mittone (2016) Couple FCO
Chat FCH
Van Vugt and De Cremer (1999) Instrumental VI
Relational VR
Fleiß and Palan (2013) Coordinator FC
Dictator FD
Levati, Sutter, and Heijden (2007) Leader LL
Strong Leader LSL
All experiments are based on public good games where subjects contribute
both individually and under a leader’s control: this can be more or less binding,
depending on the manipulation. The experimental structure is similar across
studies, but experimenters vary some factors such as group size, multiplication
factor, or leader’s election method. In my analysis, I present an overview of
the effects of leadership on cooperation, and drive the attention to the common
aspects that can be relevant in determining individuals’ choices within different
experimental designs: these are described in the following section.
In the majority of the studies, the number of leaders’ choices observations
is quite small. This depends on two main factors: the size of the experimental
sample, and the group size. Leaving aside the number of participants, larger
group sizes correspond to a smaller number of observations. This causes, for
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some studies, a large disparity between the number of individual observations
and leaders’ ones; Van Vugt and De Cremer (1999), for instance, only provide
2 leaders’ observations per treatment.
In order to drive a direct comparison across studies, I then use average
contribution values, converting them into percentage values. These are com-
puted by taking the average amount invested in the public good and dividing
it by the individual per-round endowment given to subjects.
This procedure is repeated for all the experiments considered in the analy-
sis, so that, I obtain 2 values for each study: one related to treatments where
subjects take part to the public good game individually, and the other re-
lated to treatments with leadership. Once computed these values, I derive
the shift in contributions generated by the introduction of leadership simply
taking the difference between the average percentage contributions with and
without leadership.
2.4.2 Contributions to Public Goods
Leadership seems, in general, to affect positively contributions to public good
games. In fact, the difference between the average contributions under lead-
ership and the average individual contributions is always positive. Table 2.4
reports the average percentage shift observed in each study.
Table 2.4: Studies and Contributions
Label Individual (%) Leadership (%) Shift (%)
GFL 40.16 53.64 13.48
GRL 40.16 79.20 39.04
BR 30.59 39.61 9.02
BE 32.04 54.54 22.50
FCO 48.00 60.00 12.00
FCH 48.00 54.00 6.00
VI 64.67 75.76 11.09
VR 64.12 64.41 0.28*
FC 38.58 92.45 53.87
FD 34.05 89.73 55.68
LL 39.12 57.52 18.40
LSL 39.12 61.68 22.56
* Shift reported by the authors as not statistically signif-
icant.
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The average percentage individual contribution is equal to 43.22% (sd
10.74%), while, when leadership is implemented, the average percentage con-
tribution grows to 65.21% (sd 15.22%).
Shifts are all positive and have an average percentage value of 21.99%. At
a study level, the absolute value of shifts vary from a minimum of 0.28 (Van
Vugt and De Cremer, 1999, VR) up to 55.68% (FD). Nevertheless, taking into
consideration that the result observed for VR is not statistically significant,
it is better to consider as the minimum value the one reported by Faillo,
Fornasari, and Mittone (2016) in the Chat treatment (FCH), equal to 6.00%.
Thus, all the experimental results considered (exception made for the treat-
ment random from Van Vugt and De Cremer, 1999) support what pointed out
by Charness and Jackson (2009): the presence of a leader responsible for oth-
ers systematically increases cooperation and contributions.
2.4.3 Experimental Factors
Although it is not possible to make a pure distinction among factors with
positive and negative effects, as the average shifts are all positive, I try to
understand if there are observable differences that can be attributed to some
common features of the experimental designs used by the authors. Among
these features, some are strictly related to the structure of the public good
game, others are aimed to manipulate leadership.
Public Good Game Features
I start considering the size of the group taking part to the public good game.
Previous studies (Isaac and Walker, 1988 among the others) found evidence
of the fact that contributions decrease as the group size increases. Excluding
the two studies by Fleiß and Palan (2013), where the number of subjects per
group can vary from a minimum of 2 up to a maximum of 10, my dataset
contains observations of groups having from 2 up to 6 members. Table 2.5
shows how the average shift changes in correspondence of each group size.
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Table 2.5: Group Size Effect
Group Size Observations Shift (%)
2 2 9.00
3 2 4.04
4 4 23.37
6 2 5.69
Groups of 2 members have an average shift that is quite high if compared
to groups of size 3 and 6; the average shift corresponding to group of 4 mem-
bers is much higher than others. In general, my results seem not to be in line
with previous findings, as it is not possible to find a specific relationship be-
tween group size and contributions (i.e. as group size increases, contributions
decrease).
Multiplication factors across studies are quite homogenous: Bolle and Vo-
gel (2011) applied an α equal to 1.5, Levati, Sutter, and Heijden (2007) used
a 1.67, while all the remaining experiments have an α of 1.6.
Levati, Sutter, and Heijden (2007) is also the only experiment applying a
threshold to allow the provision of the public good, and the only experiment
where subjects make decisions over real money rather than on experimental
currency units.
Altruistic punishment is present in three studies (FCO, FCH, VI), and
the average shift is 9.70%; in other studies without punishment this value is
equal to 26.09%. This reduction in the shift is quite surprising as, in general,
altruistic punishment should increase and sustain cooperation. Findings pre-
sented by Faillo, Fornasari, and Mittone (2016) explain that subjects, when
responsible for others, tend to overuse punishment reducing cooperation and
final payoffs. Nevertheless, in the studies analyzed it is possible to observe
a different tendency: altruistic punishment under leadership seems to reduce
average cooperation. Yet, taking into account the small size of the sample and
the fact that others experimental factors are left aside, this conclusion cannot
be generalized, but has to be considered only referred to the context of this
analysis.
In every study, subjects had to play for a defined number of rounds, vary-
ing from 8 to 33. Table 2.6 reports a classification of the number of rounds
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observed across experiments, together with the associated number of observa-
tions and the average shift.
Table 2.6: Number of Rounds
Rounds Observations Shift (%)
8 2 5.69
16 4 23.37
20 4 31.89
33 2 15.76
There seems to be a trend for studies with a number of rounds ranging
from 8 to 20: the higher the number of rounds, the higher the average shift in
contributions; the maximum average shift in in correspondence of 20 rounds
and it is equal to 31.89%. For the two observations corresponding to 33 rounds,
this is not true: the average shift is equal to 15.76%. One interpretation could
be that, when the number of rounds is too large (probably larger than 20),
leaders lose perception of the responsibility they have and decrease contribu-
tions for their group.
Leadership Features
I now drive the attention to the factors aimed to manipulate leadership: my
starting point is the way in which leaders are appointed.
Almost in every study, leaders are appointed randomly, with the only ex-
ception being the treatment election by Bolle and Vogel (2011). Here, the
authors implemented an election method that allowed group members to ap-
point their own leader. In terms of average shift, this corresponds to a value
of 22.50%, which is similar to the average shift for the remaining part of the
sample, equal to 21.95%.
In seven studies, appointed leaders have dictating power (i.e. they can
decide how much to contribute for their groups); in the remaining five stud-
ies, leaders are either first movers that followers can imitate or advisors with
strictly limited powers. Despite this difference in leaders’ power, average shifts
under the two conditions are 21.77% for dictating leaders, and 22.30% for other
leaders, suggesting that the general increase in contributions observed could
not depend on the type of leadership implemented.
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In both the studies by Van Vugt and De Cremer (1999), leaders were
appointed taking people from outside the group, obtaining an average shift of
5.69%; this value is much lower with respect to the one obtained when leaders
are group members, which is equal to 25,26%. Nevertheless, it is important
to remind that the shift in contributions observed in one of the treatment
Van Vugt and De Cremer (1999) (VR) is not statistically significant; thus it
is not possible to derive a conclusion from this comparison.
Three studies implemented a leadership based on a shuﬄe structure: i.e.
the person leading the group changed more than once during the implemen-
tation of the game; this happened in the experiments conducted by Bolle and
Vogel (2011) and by Gu¨th et al. (2007) (specifically, in the treatment random
leader). The average shift in contributions deriving from the implementation
of leadership in these experiments is equal to 23.5%. On the other hand, when
the leader is appointed at the beginning of the experiment and stays in charge
until the end of the last round, the average shift is equal to 21.4%.
2.4.4 Discussion
Based on my dataset, the effects of leadership in public good games seems to be
generally positive; in fact, it is possible to observe how average contributions in
treatments with individual choices are always lower than contributions driven
by leadership.
Some features of the public good game setting could cause differences
across studies: the size of groups, the implementation of altruistic punish-
ment, and the number of rounds.
Previous studies on public good games found evidence of a negative rela-
tionship between the size of groups and average contributions. In my analysis,
there seems to be a similar trend, but when groups are made of 4 people
contributions are much higher than in any other case. I find another trend in
correspondence of the number of rounds: in this case, the relationship between
repetitions and contributions is positive until the number of rounds is equal
to 20; for larger numbers I observe a decrease in contributions.
Unexpectedly, altruistic punishment under leadership corresponds, in my
analysis, to a decrease in contributions. Average shifts are still positive, so
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the effects of leadership are not completely jeopardized, but values are lower
with respect to studies where punishment is not implemented.
In line with what found by Levati, Sutter, and Heijden (2007), the elec-
tion method implemented to appoint groups leaders does not seem to affect
average shifts in contributions; similarly, making a distinction between the
types of power leaders are given is not relevant; nevertheless, it is important
to specify that I only distinguish between dictating and non-dictating powers.
On the other hand, when leaders do not belong to the group, the increase in
contribution is quite low, even if still positive.
2.5 Conclusions
The analysis presented in this study focuses on three diverse dimensions of
decision making: dictator games, delegated decision making, and leadership
in cooperation. Regarding the first dimension, I provide an overview of the
literature following the exhaustive meta-analysis by Engel (2011): the author
finds that the average share of endowment dictators allocate to their recipients
is equal to 28.35%.
Among the principal determinants of dictators’ willingness to give, it is
possible to recognize factors with a positive impact on the amount given by
the dictator, such as the presence of deserving recipients, multiple recipients,
old dictators, or recipients who earned their shares. At the same time, other
factors affect dictators’ choices negatively: decisions made by groups of dicta-
tors, games played repeatedly, recipients already owning an endowment, low
degrees of social proximity, and young dictators.
As explained by Engel (2011), dictator games have a simple structure but,
depending on the experimental setting and on the pool of subject, produce a
multiplicity of results that generates an overall complex frame; for these rea-
sons, it is not possible to generalize results in this literature, but it is possible
to use them as tools to explore humans’ preferences and their heterogeneity
of choices in simple giving tasks.
The second investigation focuses on delegated decision making under risk,
and analyzes individuals’ risky decisions made over own and others’ money.
A possible explanation to discrepancies in results across experiments could
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be provided by the fact that authors use different risk elicitation methods.
In particular, it seems that both the BDM and the GP procedure generate
results going in the same direction, while other elicitations produce somehow
contradicting findings, which might be object of further experimental tests.
Following the exercise conducted by Crosetto and Filippin (2015), I was
able to translate risk preferences obtained in experiments using the HL and GP
into a common scale: results are then compared to average values found in the
literature. In general, the GP reports degrees of risk aversion and discrepancies
between self and delegated decision making that seem to be lower than the
ones observed using the HL. Nevertheless, it is important to remind that in the
HL the categorization is discrete, while the GP provides a continuous measure.
Furthermore, the difference in the range of risk preferences captured by the
each task plays a determinant role.
I conclude my analysis moving to the third dimension, leadership in co-
operation. Some of the studies in this field could be, from a point of view,
associated to delegated decision making and cooperation; in fact, when some-
one is appointed as leader of a group, and she has the power to decide how
much the group he is responsible for should contribute to the public good (i.e.
he has dictating powers), her is similar to the one of a delegated agent; the
main difference is that, when taking part to a public good game, subjects do
not bear a defined degree of risk, but they are asked to decide under strategic
interaction.
In general, the implementation of leadership seems to generate an increase
in the average contribution to the public good. Normalizing experimental
results, I find no evidence of any negative effect derived from the presence
of group leaders, being this a coordinator, an advisor, or a pure dictator.
The main reason could be leaders and followers’ aligned monetary incentives,
together with the moral pressure generated by the responsibility for others.
In addition to this, the majority of the common factors I observed across
studies do not seem relevant for determining the shift in contributions (from
traditional public goods to public goods with leaders). From the point of view
of leadership, I only observe a decrease in the shift, which still remains posi-
tive, when appointed leaders are not group members; similarly, it is possible
to observe a reduction in the increase of contributions when some features of
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the public good game structured are manipulated: altruistic punishment, the
size of groups (exception made for group of 4), and a number of repetitions
greater than 20. Nevertheless, my study mainly focus on the differences be-
tween individual contributions and those observed under leadership; in order
to obtain a more precise analysis of the features strictly related to leadership,
it would be required to include a larger number of observations and use a
specific categorization.
To conclude, what emerges from my analysis is similar to the general find-
ings pointed out by Engel (2011). Experimental evidence on decision making
where individuals are responsible for determining their own and others’ pay-
offs generates a great heterogeneity of results. These seem to be, in many
cases, caused by differences in the experimental design adopted, others, or by
the demographic factors characterizing the pool of subjects taking part to the
experiment.
For these reasons, experimental results from single experiments should
not be generalized; nonetheless, they can be considered reliable if referred
to a defined context. Furthermore, controlling for specific experimental and
demographic factors, experiments on decision making can be used to isolate
and investigate other determinants of individuals’ socially oriented behavior.
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Investment in Risk Protection
and Social Preferences:
An Experimental Study
with Matteo Ploner and Ivan Soraperra1
3.1 Introduction
Everyday life provides many examples of how we care for others’ welfare: think
of how many people are willing to give up part of their time and resources in
order to help those in need. To a greater extent, these types of actions are not
driven by any specific material incentive or reward. Rather, they depend on
our concern for other individuals.
Previous experimental studies about other-regarding concerns mainly fo-
cused on interactions in which the consequences of actions are deterministic,
like in the dictator game (for a review see Engel, 2011). Here we extend the
inquiry of other-regarding concerns to environments in which the link between
actions and consequences is governed by chance.
Our study focuses on how individuals manage own/others’ resources to
offset risk affecting themselves/others. Specifically, we study how individuals
trade-off own/other resources to offset risk affecting themselves. Furthermore,
we study choices under risk when these affect someone else and have no direct
material consequences for the decision maker.
As such, this paper relates to two well-established research streams in eco-
nomics: decision making under risk/uncertainty and social preferences. On
the one hand, it has been widely documented that people display certain pref-
erences and attitudes toward risk. As an example, Andersen et al. (2006)
1Thanks to Dr Jacob Seifert for his precious proofreading and for the good time shared
in room 53. I’m thankful.
36
Chapter 3. Investment in Risk Protection and Social Preferences:
An Experimental Study
demonstrates that subjects taking part in laboratory experiments tend, in
general, to be risk averse. On the other hand, widespread other-regarding
concerns have been identified in field and lab experiments (e.g., Camerer,
2013). Several motives for other-regarding behavior have been put forward
in the literature. We focus here on two outcome-based motives, namely in-
equity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and efficiency concerns (e.g.,
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).
Several studies have given joint consideration to risk and social preferences
in experimental settings (for a review of early works see Trautmann and Viei-
der, 2011). Gu¨th, Levati, and Ploner (2008) shows that individuals evaluate
risk borne by others less negatively than risk borne by themselves. Krawczyk
and Le Lec (2010) shows that individuals make choices that are generally
socially and efficiency-oriented when these are in the domain of risk. Evi-
dence collected by Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) suggests that when choos-
ing among risky prospects, individuals show equity concerns, i.e. individuals
select their risk exposure to avoid being worse off than someone else, once risk
is resolved.
Another relevant stream of research is that of delegated risky decision mak-
ing, i.e. a situation in which one party chooses the amount of risk another
party has to bear, without any material incentive linking the choice of the
decision maker to the outcome of the risky prospect. Within this domain,
Agranov, Bisin, and Schotter (2014) provide evidence of what the authors de-
fine as the Other People’s Money effect, i.e. other people’s money is invested
with much lower degrees of risk aversion than is agents’ own money. Also An-
dersson et al. (2014) find that, when deciding for others, people are on average
less risk averse, mainly because of a reduction in loss aversion produced by the
usage of others resources. Chakravarty et al. (2011) interprets the shift in risk
preferences as originating in biased beliefs about other people’s preferences.
Results reported by Eriksen and Kvaløy (2014) contrast with the evidence
reported above, as participants in the experiment display a higher risk aver-
sion with respect to people’s money than their own. Further, evidence of a
composite pattern in delegated risky decision making is reported by Pahlke,
Strasser, and Vieider (2015). The study suggests that individuals are more
risk averse with others’ money in the domain of gains, but less risk averse in
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the domain of losses.
In spite of the lack of consistent results concerning risk propensity, studies
on delegated decision making show a general tendency: individuals decide dif-
ferently when using others’ money rather than their own. To explain observed
behavior, most of the studies mentioned above focus on the risk preferences
of the decision maker and on their beliefs about the risk preferences of the
counterpart. We suggest here that taking social preferences into account may
provide a better understanding of behavior, helping to explain these appar-
ently conflicting results. We test this intuition using the simple model of social
preferences introduced by Charness and Rabin (2002), with the aim of provid-
ing an alternative to risk preferences as the only explanation to discrepancies
in self and other-oriented decision making under risk.
We present a modified dictator game to test how much subjects are willing
to pay to offset risk for themselves and for someone else, using either their own
money or someone else’s money. We focus on two specific types of subjects
in terms of social preferences: difference-averse, and welfare-enhancing. Both
types make delegated decisions that are consistent with higher degrees of risk
aversion when the subject’s own money is at stake. In addition to this, we ob-
serve that individuals having access to others’ resources use these in order to
protect themselves from risk. Furthermore, we find evidence of altruistic be-
haviors: subjects show a willingness to use their own wealth to buy protection
for others. Overall, our results emphasize the importance of social preferences
when risky choices have social spillovers.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Task
During the experiment, subjects are asked to perform a dictator game-like task
and are assigned to two roles: decision maker (dictator) and passive player
(recipient). Dictators are shown five cards on a computer screen, each one
associated to a different payoff allocation for themselves and for the recipient.
Dictators are asked to choose the one they prefer to determine the payoff for
themselves and for the recipient they are paired with. Knowledge about the
payoffs is experimentally manipulated.
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The experiment is divided into two parts. In part 1, the five cards are
displayed face-up, each card reporting two outcomes in euro (see Figure 3.1).
The value in the upper left corner of the card represents dictator’s payoff (piy),
while the value in the lower right corner represents recipients’ payoff (pix). In
part 1, the dictator’s payoff is always equal to 10 euros, while the recipient’s
payoff can vary between 8 euros and 12 euros, so that the set of possible
outcomes is Π : {(8, 10), (9, 10), (10, 10), (11, 10), (12, 10)}. Dictators choose
the card they prefer and then proceed to the second part of the experiment.
Figure 3.1: Cards Face-up
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In part 2, five cards are displayed, each implying a particular monetary
outcome for both the dictator and the recipient, as in part 1. However, unlike
in part 1, the cards are face-down and payoffs associated to each card are not
known to the decision maker (see Figure 3.2). However, the distribution of
outcomes for the dictator (piy) and for the other is common knowledge (pix),
as explained in Section 3.2.2. Therefore, unlike in part 1, dictators face a
genuinely risky choice.
Figure 3.2: Cards Face-down
Before making a blind choice, dictators have the option to turn over the
five cards by participating in a lottery. This is implemented through a BDM
procedure (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964). Dictators post a monetary
offer 0 ≤ b ≤ 6 that represents their willingness to pay (WTP) to turn over the
cards. We take this WTP as a direct measure of investment in risk protection.
After offers are made, a random value 0 ≤ r ≤ 6 is drawn from a uniform
distribution, so that all the values in the interval have the same probability of
3.2. Methodology 39
being extracted. If the random value drawn is smaller than, or equal to, the
value offered by the subject (r ≤ b), all five cards are turned and r is the price
paid to resolve the uncertainty. If the random value drawn is higher than the
value offered by subjects (r > b), the cards are not turned and no price is
paid.
Once the procedure is over, the dictator chooses one of the five cards, either
face-up or face-down, according to the outcome of the BDM procedure.
3.2.2 Treatments
As shown by Table 3.1, two factors are experimentally manipulated. The first
factor, manipulated in a between-subjects fashion, is the identity of the subject
bearing the cost of the bid (Cost). Depending on the treatment, the cost is
deducted from either the dictator’s payoff (Cost.Self) or from the recipient’s
payoff (Cost.Other).
The second factor we manipulate, this time in a within-subjects fashion
over two distinct rounds of part 2, is the identity of the individual bearing the
risk of a choice made with face-down cards (Risk). Specifically, in one round
the dictator’s payoff is always equal to 10 euros and recipient’s payoff can be
either 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 euros, depending on the card chosen (Risk.other)). In
this case, the recipient is the subject bearing the risk, while the dictator faces
a safe payoff equal to the expected value of the recipient’s risky payoffs. In the
alternative round, the recipient’s payoff is fixed at 10 euros, while the dictator
bears the risk of getting either 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 euros, with equal likelihood.
The order of the phases was administered to balance the number of dictators
and recipients bearing the risk in Phase 1, thus controlling for potential order
effects.
Table 3.1: Table of Treatments and labels adopted.
Risk
Self Other
Cost
Self (N = 76) CS/RS CS/RO
Other (N = 80) CO/RS CO/RO
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3.2.3 Participants and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Cognitive and Experimental Economics
Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. Participants were recruited
among undergraduate students. The experiment was programmed and con-
ducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 1999). We conducted 8 experi-
mental sessions and a total of 156 subjects took part in the experiment. Each
subject received a e3.00 show-up fee, plus a sum that varied depending on
their performance in the experiment. This was, on average, equal to e10.13.
Upon their arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer and
received instructions for the experiment.2 Subjects had 5 minutes to read
the general instructions and those related to the first part of the experiment,
then these were read aloud by one of the experimenters. Once all subjects
successfully answered a comprehension test, the experiment started.
Choices were collected via a vector strategy method.3 Initially, all partic-
ipants were assigned to the role of dictator. The software randomly paired
subjects, and they did not know who they were paired with. Subjects all ex-
pressed their decisions as dictators and, only at the end of the experiment,
before the determination of final payments, they were randomly divided into
dictators and recipients. Note that participants were made aware that the
choices of those assigned to be recipients did not affect the final payment.
Once subjects complete part 1 of the experiment, they were given two
minutes to read the instructions for part 2. Then, an experimenter reads
them out again and answered questions, when needed. Subjects completed a
short comprehension questionnaire and then the second part of the experiment
started.
Once subjects completed the second part of the experiment, they were
randomly assigned the role of dictator or recipient, and they received feed-
back about the three cards chosen during the experiment (one in part 1 and
two in part 2), either by themselves or by the dictator they were paired with.
The software randomly drew one of the three choices to determine the final
2An English translation is available in the appendix.
3This choice was mainly driven by the experiment budget. We are aware of the fact that
such a procedure has been criticized because it creates uncertainty on the effective roles of
participants; nevertheless, Brandts and Charness (2011) provide prove of its efficacy.
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payment, thereby ending the experiment. This protocol is called “pay-one-at-
random” and, despite it induces a meta-lottery in the experiment, it is con-
sidered a commonly accepted procedure. Experimental results can be affected
when predictions are based on Rank Dependent Utility: considering that our
experiment relies on Expected Utility, we believe the payment procedure won’t
have consequences on our study.
Before being paid, subjects were asked to answer two sets of questions.4
The first was composed of eight questions extracted from the Levenson’s IPC
scale (Levenson, 1972) and produced a measurement of subjects’ locus of con-
trol. The higher the score, the more subjects think events in their life de-
pend on their own actions. The second questionnaire was composed of seven
questions extracted from the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale
(Weber, Blais, and Betz, 2002), which measures subjects’ risk attitudes. 5 We
acknowledge that, from a psychological point of view, information we gather
through these questionnaires is limited by the fact that it is retrieved via
non-validated protocols. However, given time restrictions, we had to rely on
excerpts of the original questionnaires.
3.2.4 Behavioral Predictions
Risk-free choices in part 1 allow us to classify individuals in terms of their
social preferences. In so doing, we rely on the following specification of the
model by Charness and Rabin (2002)(henceforth CR):
CRy(pix, piy) =
{
(1− ρ)piy + ρpix if piy ≥ pix
(1− σ)piy + σpix if piy < pix (3.1)
where CRy is the utility of a player Y , ρ and σ capture the concern for
other’s welfare, pix and piy are respectively player X and player Y ’s payoffs.
Depending on the payoff that dictators allocate to recipients, dictators can
be assigned to the following three main categories: welfare-enhancing (WE),
competitive (CP), and difference-averse (DA).6 The model unambiguously pre-
dicts WE types to choose the highest outcome for the other (i.e., pix = 12),
4An English version of the questionnaires is included in the appendix.
5The seven sample questions we extracted from the 30 questions DOSPERT questionnaire
were chosen according to the focus of our research, and consist of four questions related to
the financial domain and three related to the social one.
6Types are characterized by distinct parameters constellations. For welfare-enhancing we
have that 1≥ ρ ≥ σ > 0; for difference-averse we have that σ < 0 < ρ < 1.
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DA types to choose the intermediate outcome (i.e., pix = 10), and CP types to
choose the lowest outcome (i.e., pix = 8). Strictly selfish types do not have any
preference as far as the other’s payoff is concerned; thus, they are assumed to
be randomly distributed among the five outcomes.
Based on model 3.1, we present here predictions about bid levels in alterna-
tive experimental conditions in part 2 of the experiment. The full derivation
of our predictions is reported in Appendix 3.6. We rely on the assumption
that the decision maker maximizes her CR’s expected utility. In addition to
the standard assumptions of the model, we assume that ρ ≤ .5, which im-
plies that the individuals value their own utility more than the utility of the
other when they are better off than the other. For the sake of simplicity, we
rely on the original, (piece-wise) linear model specification. While the curva-
ture of the utility function is a relevant factor in choices like those considered
here, we maintain that the linear specification provides us with a satisfactory
approximation of the actual preference structure.
Under these assumptions, we obtain a full rank of optimal bids in the 4
alternative conditions: b∗CO/RS ≥ b∗CO/RO ≥ b∗CS/RS ≥ b∗CS/RO. Thus, irre-
spective of their type in the CR model, decision makers will post higher bids
when the cost is borne by the other than when the cost is borne by themselves.
In fact, when the cost is borne by subjects themselves, we have that b∗ ≤ 2.6
and, when the cost is borne by another, we have that b∗ > 2.
In the light of these predictions, we proceed to test the following two
Hypotheses, which consider the way decision makers manage the shifting of
costs and risks between themselves and the experimental other.
Hypothesis 3.1 Risk borne by dictators.
When risk is borne by the dictators, they invest more in risk protection when
the cost of the investment is borne by the other than when it is borne by
themselves (b∗CO/RS > b
∗
CS/RS).
Hypothesis 3.2 Cost borne by dictators.
When the cost of investing in risk protection is borne by the dictators, they are
investing more in risk protection when risk is borne by themselves than when
it is borne by the other (b∗CS/RS > b
∗
CS/RO).
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Our model predicts that individuals address risk differently when risk
and costs are entirely born by themselves (CS/RS) rather than the other
(CO/RO). In particular, as summarized below, our model provides us with
clear-cut guidance as to how individuals behave in a setting of delegated de-
cision making under risk, depending on whether they are choosing for others
with others’ resources, or choosing for themselves with their own resources.
Hypothesis 3.3 Delegated risky choice.
Dictators are going to buy more risk protection when risk and costs are borne by
the other than when risk and costs are borne by themselves (b∗CO/RO > b
∗
CS/RS).
The model also provides us with testable predictions about how investment
in risk protection differs according to an individual’s social preference type.
Under the assumption that DA and WE share the same ρ, DA are predicted
to post higher bids than WE in all conditions but CS/RO. In this case, b∗
is decreasing for σ < 0 and increasing for σ > 0 and this complicates the
comparison between the two types; we have σ < 0 for the DA and σ > 0 for
the WE. Furthermore, the difference in bids between condition CS/RS and
conditions CO/RS, CO/RO should be larger for DA than for WE.
Hypothesis 3.4 Risk protection and social types.
Overall, DA types are going to buy more risk protection than WE types (b∗DA >
b∗WE).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Classification of Social Types
Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of choices in part 1, when cards are face-
up and there is no uncertainty. Darker bars refer to participants that fall
under a specific social type categorization, according the CR model presented
above. Those giving 8, 10, and 12 can be identified with the competitive (CP),
difference-averse (DA), and welfare-enhancing (WE) types, respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Social Preferences Types
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As Figure 3.3 highlights, the large majority of choices is observed in cor-
respondence to the maximum transfer (pix = 12) to the other participant
(64.7%). Intermediate transfers (pix = 10) and minimal transfers (pix = 8)
capture the 21.8% and 5.1% of choices, respectively. This results in sustained
average transfers (=11.2), close to the maximum of 12.
3.3.2 Investment in Risk Protection
Figure 3.4 presents the willingness to pay (WTP) distribution in the four
experimental conditions of part 2. A higher WTP signals a higher attraction
for the safe environment of choice relative to the uncertain one. Boxplots
capture quartiles of the distributions and circles provide a representation of
the frequency of each choice, with the radius of the circle proportional to the
number of choices observed for a given level of WTP. Bold lines and numbers
identify median and average choices, respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of WTP across Conditions
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Figure 3.4 shows that the highest average (median) bid is observed in
condition CO/RS and that the lowest is observed in condition CS/RO. The
figure provides full support to the predictions of section 3.6, with bids in alter-
native conditions reflecting hypothesis obtain from the CR model : b∗CO/RS ≥
b∗CO/RO ≥ b∗CS/RS ≥ b∗CS/RO.
The model also predicts that bids are going to be lower than or equal to
2.6, when the cost is borne by the dictator. Non-parametric tests show that
this is the case both in condition CS/RO and in condition CS/RS (WST
both p-values < 0.001).7 In contrast, when the cost is borne by the other,
bids should be above a lower bound of 2. Non-parametric tests again support
the predictions, both in condition CO/RO and in condition CO/RS (WST,
both p-values < 0.037).
Choices in condition CO/RS show that, when participants use the other’s
resources to protect themselves from risk, they choose a positive WTP (WST,
p-value< 0.001). However, in contrast to what selfishness would predict, the
7All tests reported are two-sided, when not specified. WRT stands for Wilcoxon Rank
Sum Test. WST stands for Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test.
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central tendency of the distribution is different from the maximum amount of
6 (WST, p-value< 0.001).
An interesting measure of the degree of “opportunism” shown by subjects
is given by the difference between WTP in CO/RS and CS/RS. According
to a non-parametric test, the positive difference between the two conditions is
statistically significant (WRT, p-value< 0.001).
Result 3.1 The dictators invest more of the other’s resources than of their
own resources to protect themselves from risk.
Choices in condition CS/RO inform us of the degree of concern for risk
affecting the other when own resources are at stake. In contrast to what is
predicted by pure selfishness, the average level of WTP in this condition is
different from zero (WST, p-value< 0.001). Nevertheless, individuals seem to
value risk more when this affects themselves than when it affects the others,
as confirmed by a non-parametric test (WST, p-value=0.008).
Result 3.2 The dictators invest more of their resources in risk protection
when risk is borne by themselves than when it is borne by the other.
The comparison between condition CS/RS and condition CO/RO sug-
gests that our participants tend to attach a higher negative value to risk when
the cost of offsetting it and the consequences of choices are borne by others
than when they are borne by themselves. Indeed, a comparison of the two
conditions shows that the WTP in the latter is statistically higher than in the
former (WRT, p.value=0.014).
Result 3.3 The dictators invest more in risk protection when delegated to
choose for others than when choosing for themselves.
3.3.3 Risk Protection and Social Types
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics about WTP choices in alternative experi-
mental conditions and for the two most common social types: difference-averse
(DA) and welfare-enhancing (WE).8
As Table 3.2 shows, the highest average (median) bid is observed in con-
dition CO/RS for the DA types, while the lowest average (median) bid is
8In the analysis below we omit CP because of the low number of observations collected
(i.e., 8) for this social type.
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Table 3.2: Risk Protection and Social Types
DA WE
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
CS/RS 1.639 2.000 1.171 1.791 2.000 1.589
CS/RO 1.227 0.800 1.543 1.403 1.000 1.698
CO/RS 4.097 4.000 1.736 2.685 2.000 1.903
CO/RO 3.226 3.000 1.937 2.086 2.000 1.596
observed in condition CS/RO for the WE types. When comparing bids of the
DA and the WE, the largest positive difference in average bids is observed in
condition CO/RS. The smallest difference is registered in condition CS/RO.
In line with predictions obtained above, the difference between the DA and
WE in condition CS/RO is small and negative.
A series of non-parametric tests shows that no significant differences be-
tween the two types are observed in conditions in which the decision maker
has to pay for protection from risk, CS/RS and CS/RO (WRT, both p-values
> .650). In contrast, in the conditions in which the other pays for protection,
i.e. CO/RS and CO/RO, the DA types tend to systematically buy more
protection from risk (WRT, both p-values< 0.032)
Result 3.4 DA types tend to invest more of the other’s resources in protection
from risk than WE types.
Further insights about the consistency of behavior of alternative social
types are gathered from the payoffs of those facing risk in part 2 when the
bid is successful and cards are turned face-up. In such a condition, when the
decision maker is a DA type the average payoffs are equal to 11.451 and 9.392
for the decision maker and the recipient, respectively (diff=2.059). When the
decision maker is a WE type, the average payoffs are 11.406 and 10.864 for the
decision maker and the recipient, respectively (diff=0.542). Non-parametric
tests on individual averages show that the two types differ statistically in the
payoffs of the recipients, but not in own payoffs (WRT, p-value=0.008 and p-
value=0.836, respectively). As expected, a much wider gap in ex-post payoffs
within a couple is registered when the decision maker is a DA type and this
confirms the relevance of outcome-based considerations, even when the choice
in part 2 is risk free.
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3.3.4 Regression Analysis
Table 3.3 reports on the regression outcomes of a Linear Mixed Model estima-
tion. The estimates are restricted to individuals classified as DA or WE (135
individuals). The dependent variable in the model is given by WTP , a direct
measure of investment in risk protection. Model 1 controls for the impact of
treatments on the decision to invest in risk protection. The treatment dummy
CS is equal to 1 when cost of the investment is borne by subjects themselves
and 0 when it is borne by the other. The treatment dummy RS is equal to
1 when risk is borne by self and 0 when it is borne by the other. The im-
pact of the two variables is estimated both in isolation and in interaction. In
Model 2, we add a control for social types and introduce the dummy variable
type.DA, equal to 1 when an individual is classified as difference-averse, as de-
duced from choices in the first task, and equal to 0 when classified as welfare
enhancing. The dummy variable type.DA is also interacted with treatment
dummies. Finally, in Model 3 we add additional controls for demographic
characteristics (Age and Female), for field of study (Econ is equal to 1 if
students of Economics and 0 otherwise) and for self-reported measures in the
DOSPERT questionnaire and in the Levenson’s IPC scale. According to the
Akaike’s Information criterion (AIC), the most efficient specification is that of
Model 2.
As the estimates of Model (1) show, dictators invest less in risk protection
when the cost is borne by themselves rather than by the other (CS = −1.026).
In contrast, more protection is bought when risk affects the dictator rather
than the other (RS = 0.671). This pattern is consistent with Results 1 and
2 reported above. Furthermore, the linear hypothesis test CS + RS + CS :
RS = 0 (Chisq=4.517, p-value=0.034) shows that participants tend to invest
less in risk protection when choosing for themselves than when delegated to
choose for others. This confirms what is reported above in Result 3.
Model 2 takes into account the impact of treatment dummies, controlling
for social preferences. According to the results of Model 2, difference-averse
types tend to invest more in risk protection than welfare-enhancing types
(type.DA = 1.140), when cost and risk are borne by the other. Furthermore,
the negative impact of CS on the investment is (marginally) stronger for
the DA, as shown by the estimated coefficient for the interaction term CS :
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Table 3.3: WTP Determinants (LMM Regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 2.387 (0.203)∗∗∗ 2.086 (0.232)∗∗∗ 4.397 (1.765)∗
CS −1.026 (0.298)∗∗∗ −0.683 (0.336)∗ −0.647 (0.337)◦
RS 0.671 (0.214)∗∗ 0.599 (0.251)∗ 0.599 (0.251)∗
CS : RS −0.277 (0.313) −0.212 (0.364) −0.212 (0.364)
type.DA 1.140 (0.451)∗ 1.087 (0.462)∗
CS : type.DA −1.316 (0.672)◦ −1.430 (0.676)∗
RS : type.DA 0.271 (0.488) 0.271 (0.488)
CS : RS : type.DA −0.246 (0.728) −0.246 (0.728)
Age −0.018 (0.052)
Econ −0.455 (0.261)◦
Female 0.060 (0.267)
DOSPERT.score −0.016 (0.027)
LEV INSON.score −0.042 (0.034)
AIC 1044.105 1039.642 1060.882
Num. obs. 270 270 270
Num. groups: ID 135 135 135
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
type.DA. Thus, DA types are more likely to exploit others’ resources to invest
in risk protection than WE types, in line with Result 4.
Estimates of Model 3 are, overall, in line with the results of Model 2.
Among the control variables, only the field of study has a (weakly) significant
effect on investment propensity, with students of economics investing lower
amounts in risk protection than others.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusions
Outcomes from our experiment shed new light on three fundamental questions
about risky decision-making involving social spillovers: i) do individuals use
more resources to offset risk when accessing others’ resources rather than own
resources? ii) Do individuals use more resources to offset risk borne by them-
selves rather than by others? iii) Do individuals offset risk differently when
choosing for themselves rather than when delegated to choose for others?
To answer these questions, we assess behavior in a simple experimental
task against predictions obtained from a manageable and well-known model for
social preferences.9 Results obtained provide strong support to the predictive
ability of the model in the context under investigation. Specifically, we show
9Note that we rely on the model by Charness and Rabin, 2002: this was one of the first
models for Social Preferences.
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that individuals buy more risk protection when another provides the resources
(i) above), but are less likely to invest own resources to protect others than to
protect themselves (ii). Furthermore, decision makers seem to invest more in
risk protection when delegated to choose than when choosing for themselves
(iii).
We show that differences in investment in risk protection across individu-
als are largely predicted by their social preference attitudes, with difference-
averse types generally investing more resources in risk protection than welfare-
enhancing types. This is mainly due to the fact that individuals endowed with
inequity averse preferences dislike the perspective of lagging behind others
(Linde and Sonnemans, 2012).
Our study highlights the importance of allocational considerations in risky
choices involving others’ welfare.10 In a typical delegated risky choice, the
decision maker has no stakes in the choice. Thus, standard self-centered utility
models do not provide clear guidance in predicting behavior. In addition to
this, even allowing for other-regarding concerns, it would not be possible to
define precisely what curvature of the utility function should be applied to
the other. Here we neglect considerations about the curvature of the utility
function and specifically focus on other-regarding concerns. This provides us
with clear-cut predictions which are, overall, confirmed by the data gathered
in the course of the experiment.
While there is scope for further research in this area to enrich the picture
by modeling tastes for risk more explicitly, we feel that the evidence presented
here nonetheless represents an important step along this research path.
10Note that we refer to a two-players game and to our specific experimental structure: at
this stage, it is not possible to generalize our conclusions to a multiple-players structure.
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3.5 Appendix - Experimental Instructions
Following we include an English translation of the experiment instructions.
In order to match our experimental design, we had the need to produce four
different version of the instructions (i.e. one for each treatment). General
instructions and Instructions for the first part of the experiment were common
for all the four treatments, while instructions for the second part were suitably
edited.
As explained in the section on the experimental design, two treatments, i.e.
the ones related to the risky component (Risk), are applied within subjects.
This means that steps in the instructions referring to these treatments were
common to the four versions. Nevertheless, we introduced a variation in the
instruction to control for the order bias.
Here we present a version containing the edited parts. Every time we will
be referring to one of these, there will always be a label between squared
brackets indicating to what treatment the step refers to. Labels can either
refer to the treatment related to the money used to buy the right to turn
the cards, or to the order according to which participants, depending on their
roles, bear the risk of receiving n unknown payment during the two phases in
the second part of the experiment.
In the first case, if we refer to the treatment in which Participant 2 has
to be charged of the eventual cost of turning the cards you will read the label
[Cost.Oth], while if we refer to the treatment in which Participant 2 has to
be charged of the eventual cost of turning the cards you will read the label
[Cost.Own].
Similarly, when describing the two phases in the second part of the exper-
iment, if Participant 1 is the first to bear the risk of receiving an unknown
payment you will read the label [Risk.Ownf irst], while if Participant 2 is the
first to bear the risk of receiving an unknown payment you will read the label
[Risk.Othf irst]. These labels will be integrated with one of the label for the
cost treatment. For instance, if the cost of turning the cards has to be borne
by Participant 2 and Participant 1 is the first one to bear the risk of the
unknown payment, you will find the label [Cost.Oth/Risk.Onf irst].
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General Instructions
Welcome,
You are about to take part into an experiment on economic decisions. For
being here on time, at the end of the experiment, you will receive 2.50 euros.
May you have any doubt during the experiment, please raise your hand and
ask a staff member. If you use the computer for activities not strictly related to
the experiment, you will be excluded by the experiment and by any payment.
The experiment is divided into two independent parts. In the first part
there is only one decisional phase, while in the second part there are two
independent decisional phases. Thus, you will face a total of 3 decisional
phases.
Following you will receive the instructions for the first part of the exper-
iment. Once the first part will end, you will receive the instructions for the
second part. We ask you to read the instructions carefully. Before the begin-
ning of each part of the experiment you will have to answer some questions to
verify your comprehension of the instructions.
During each phase of the experiment you will have the possibility to earn a
sum of euros. This sum will not depend from the sum earned during another
phase. Your final payment for the experiment will be defined at the end of the
experiment by randomly drawing the earning from one of the three decisional
phases.
During the experiment participants will have two roles: Participant 1 and
Participant 2. Initially, all the participants will be assigned the role of Partici-
pant 1, but they will know their actual role only at the end of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment half of the participants will be randomly as-
signed the role of Participant 1 and the other half the role of Participant 2.
Every Participant 1 will be randomly associated to only one Participant 2.
Choices made by participants who will be assigned the role of Participant 1
will define earnings for themselves and the Participant 2 they are associated
to, according to the rules that will follow. Thus, choices made by participants
who will be assigned the role of Participant 2 will not be relevant in deter-
mining experiment final payments.
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Instructions - First Part
In this part of the experiment on your monitor you will be shown 5 cards,
each one containing two sums in euros. The red sum in the upper left repre-
sents Participant 1 ’s earning, while the black sum in the lower right represents
Participant 2 ’s earning. The following figure shows an example of a possible
display condition of the cards (the order will be random and it may not cor-
respond to the one in the screenshot below).
During this first phase, Participant 1 ’s earning is always equal to 10 eu-
ros. The earning assigned to Participant 2 can vary depending on Participant
1 ’s choice and can assume an integer value between 8 euros and 12 euros.
Participant 1 ’s task is to choose the combination of payments they prefer for
themselves and Participant 2 by clicking the button ”I CHOOSE THIS ONE”
below the desired card. In order to avoid eventual errors, participants will be
asked to confirm their own choices after having made them. In case there
would be an error in the choice it will be enough not to confirm it and to
repeat the operation.
Instructions - Second Part
The second part of the experiment is composed of two phases. In both
phases Participant 1 will be shown 5 face-down cards (see screenshot below).
Each hole card has on its face two sums corresponding to the earnings
for Participant 1 and Participant 2. One of the two participants will always
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receive a payment equal to 10 euros, while the other participant will receive
a payment that may correspond to 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 euros, depending on
the chosen card. In one phase the payment always equal to 10 euros will be
given to Participant 1, while in the other phase the payment always equal to
10 euros will be given to Participant 2. More details about this are provided
below.
As in the first phase, the red sum in the upper left represents Participant
1 ’s earning, while the black sum in the lower right represents Participant 2 ’s
earning. It is possible to know the couple of earnings associated to each card
only by turning the cards. Since the distribution of the cards is randomly de-
termined in every phase, the order of the cards observed in one of the phases
does not provide any information about their order in a different phase.
Participant 1 will be asked to make an offer to buy the possibility to turn
simultaneously all the 5 cards. The offer will have to be between 0 and 6 euros
(included) and it will have to be approximated to the second decimal number,
by using a dot to separate integer and decimals.
The probability of turning the cards will depend on the offer made by
Participant 1 and will be defined by following this procedure:
• A value between 0 and 6 will be randomly drawn by the software so
that all the values between 0 and 6 have the same probability of being
extracted.
• If the randomly drawn value will be less or equal to Participant 1 ’s offer:
– cards will be turned,
– [Cost.Oth] the value randomly drawn by the software will be de-
ducted from Participant 2 ’s payment indicated on the card chosen
by Participant 1.
– [Cost.Own] the value randomly drawn by the software will be de-
ducted from Participant 1 ’s payment indicated on the card chosen
by Participant 1.
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• If the randomly drawn value will be higher than Participant 1 ’s offer:
– cards will not be turned,
– [Cost.Oth] the value randomly drawn by the software will not be
deducted from Participant 2 ’s payment indicated on the card cho-
sen by Participant 1.
– [Cost.Own] the value randomly drawn by the software will not
be deducted from Participant 1 ’s payment indicated on the card
chosen by Participant 1.
[Cost.Oth] Based on this procedure, the best strategy for Participant 1 is
to make an offer corresponding to the maximum value they would like Partic-
ipant 2 to pay to turn all the cards.
[Cost.Own] Based on this procedure, the best strategy for Participant 1
is to make an offer corresponding to the maximum value they would like to
pay to turn all the cards.
Participant 1 ’s task is to choose the card they prefer. If the combination
between offer made and random draw allows to turn the cards, Participant 1
will have the possibility to choose one of the face-up cards, otherwise they will
have to choose one of the cards without knowing the consequences of their
choice. In both cases, the choice is made by clicking the button ”I CHOOSE
THIS ONE” below the desired card.
Participant 1 ’s choice define both Participant 1 and Participant 2 ’s pay-
ments. If the choice is made upon a hole card, Participant 1 will receive
feedback about Participant 2 ’s payment only at the end of the second part.
[Cost.Oth] It is important to remember that, if cards are turned, Partici-
pant 2 ’s payment will be equal to the payment associated to the chosen card
reduced of the value randomly drawn by the software.
[Cost.Own] It is important to remember that, if cards are turned, Partic-
ipant 1 ’s payment will be equal to the payment associated to the chosen card
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reduced of the value randomly drawn by the software.
During the experiment the term ”payment” will correspond to the value
illustrated on the cards, while the term ”earning” will correspond to the value
illustrated on the chosen card reduced by the cost of turning the cards.
The described procedure will be common to the two phases in the second
part of the experiment. The two phases will differ only in the distribution of
the payments illustrated on the cards.
Phase 1
[Cost.Oth/Risk.Othf irst] Participant 1 ’s payment will be always equal to
10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 2 will vary depending on Par-
ticipant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 euros
and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software will
be deducted from Participant 2 ’s payment.
[Cost.Own/Risk.Othf irst] Participant 1 ’s payment will be always equal
to 10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 2 will vary depending on
Participant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 eu-
ros and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software
will be deducted from Participant 1 ’s payment.
[Cost.Oth/Risk.Ownf irst] Participant 2 ’s payment will be always equal
to 10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 1 will vary depending on
Participant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 eu-
ros and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software
will be deducted from Participant 2 ’s payment.
[Cost.Own/Risk.Ownf irst] Participant 2 ’s payment will be always equal
to 10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 1 will vary depending on
Participant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 eu-
ros and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software
will be deducted from Participant 1 ’s payment.
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Phase 2
[Cost.Oth/Risk.Othf irst] Participant 2 ’s payment will be always equal to
10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 1 will vary depending on Par-
ticipant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 euros
and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software will
be deducted from Participant 2 ’s payment.
[Cost.Own/Risk.Othf irst] Participant 2 ’s payment will be always equal
to 10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 1 will vary depending on
Participant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 eu-
ros and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software
will be deducted from Participant 1 ’s payment.
[Cost.Oth/Risk.Ownf irst] Participant 1 ’s payment will be always equal
to 10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 2 will vary depending on
Participant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 eu-
ros and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software
will be deducted from Participant 2 ’s payment.
[Cost.Own/Risk.Ownf irst] Participant 1 ’s payment will be always equal
to 10 euros. The payment assigned to Participant 2 will vary depending on
Participant 1 ’s choice and it will have one of the integer values between 8 eu-
ros and 12 euros. If cards are turned, the value randomly drawn by software
will be deducted from Participant 1 ’s payment.
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Questionnaires
Following we include an English translation of the questionnaires our ex-
perimental subjects answered to at the end of the experiment. As explained in
the section on the experimental design, our purpose is not to obtain validated
psychological measures that can implement our analysis. In fact, we just are
interested in gathering some information about possible factors of influence
that could drive subjects’ decisions during the experiment.
Levenson’s Scale
We kindly ask you to answer the following questionnaire truthfully.
We ask you to indicate how much you agree with each of the following
statements by using a scale of 6 values that goes from ”I don’t agree at all”
to ”I totally agree”. Moving your choice on the radio button toward the right
you increase your agreement with the statement on the scale that goes from
”I don’t agree at all” to ”I totally agree”.
1. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings.
2. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.
3. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad
luck happenings.
4. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky.
5. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
6. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune.
7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it.
8. My life is determined by my own actions.
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Dospert
We kindly ask you to answer the following questionnaire truthfully.
We kindly ask you to answer the following questionnaire truthfully. For
each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would
engage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that
situation. Provide a rating from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, us-
ing the following scale: 1 = ”Extremely unlikely”, 2 = ”Moderately unlikely”,
3 =”Somewhat unlikely”, 4 = ”Not sure”, 5 =”Somewhat likely”, 6 = ”Mod-
erately likely”, 7 =”Extremely likely”.
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend.
2. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
3. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
4. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event.
5. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.
6. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one.
7. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work.
Demographic and Other Information
Please, fill the following fields.
1. Date of Birth:
2. Gender:
3. Field of Studies:
4. Number of experiment to which you have participated:
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3.6 Appendix - Predictions
Decisional Setting
We derive here the predictions about the size of the bid b ∈ [0, 6] that
decision makers are paying to turn the cards and solve uncertainty. The indi-
vidual facing uncertainty chooses over a lottery with five potential outcomes
pi1, . . . , pi5 and each outcome pii = (piix, pi
i
y) gives a payoff of player X and Y .
All pii have the same probability P (pii) = 1/5 to be picked when cards are
face-down.
A random price p ∼ U(0, 6) is drawn from a uniform distribution and
cards are turned and uncertainty is solved when b ≥ p. Depending on the
treatment, the price p is paid either by the decision maker Y or by the player
X and then the decision maker can freely choose the preferred card. When
p < b, uncertainty is not solved and the decision maker picks one of the cards
that are face-down.
Here we derive some behavioral predictions about the size of the bid con-
ditional upon social types and experimental manipulations. We assume that
subjects preferences follow the social utility function of Charness and Rabin
(hereafter, CR)
CRy(pix, piy) =
{
(1− ρ)piy + ρpix if piy ≥ pix
(1− σ)piy + σpix if piy < pix (3.2)
where CRy is the utility of a player Y , ρ and σ capture other’s welfare
concerns, pix and piy are respectively player X and player Y ’s payoffs. Here
we focus on two main social types, Difference-Averse (DA) and Welfare En-
hancing (WE). The latter are characterized by 1 > ρ ≥ σ > 0. The former
are characterized by σ < 0 < ρ < 1. For the sake of tractability, we stick to
the original model and assume that utility is (piece-wise) linear in monetary
payoffs.
Concerning experimental manipulations, decision makers are facing four
alternative conditions in which the risk may be borne by themselves or by the
other and p may be paid by themselves or by the other.
Risk
Self Other
Cost
Self CS/RS CS/RO
Other CS/RO CO/RO
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In the following, we obtain predictions for each of the four alternative
conditions.
Cost.Self/Risk.Self (CS/RS)
In this condition, outcomes are pi1 = (8, 10), pi2 = (9, 10), pi3 = (10, 10),
pi4 = (11, 10), and pi5 = (12, 10). Decision makers post a bid b that maximizes
their expected utility, as measured by the CR model reported above (equation
3.2). The expected utility of the decision maker is equal to
EU [b] = (1− PT (b))UNT +
∫ b
0
1
6
CRy(pi
∗
x(p), pi
∗
y(p)− p)dp (3.3)
where PT (b) =
b
6 represents the probability of turning the displayed cards,
UNT =
∑5
i=1
1
5CRy(pi
i
x, pi
i
y) is the (expected) utility when cards are not turned,
and pi∗(b) = (pi∗x(p), pi∗y(p)) is the optimal choice given that cards are turned
and price p is paid.
Since CRy(pix, piy) is increasing in piy for all feasible ρ and σ, the optimal
choice when cards are turned is pi∗(p) = pi5 for all p. Then, expected utility
becomes:
EU [b] =

(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ) + ∫ b0 16 [(1− ρ)(12− p) + ρ10] dp if b ≤ 2(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ) + ∫ 20 16 [(1− ρ)(12− p) + ρ10] dp+
+
∫ b
2
1
6
[(1− σ)(12− p) + σ10] dp if b > 2
(3.4)
Note that: (i) the function is continuous—for b = 2 the two equations have
the same value—and (ii) both equations are concave parabolae—(1 − ρ) and
(1−σ) are positive. So in order to find the optimal bid we only need to consider
the position of the vertexes of the parabolae that are in b = 10−7ρ−3σ5(1−ρ) and
b = 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) respectively. In particular the maximum of the first parabola
is in b ≤ 2 only if σ ≥ ρ which is never the case, so the function EU [b] is
increasing for b ≤ 2. Moreover the maximum of the second parabola is always
in b ≥ 2 hence the unique optimal bid is b∗ = 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) .
The optimal bid goes from b∗ = 2 when σ = ρ to b∗ = 2.6 when σ → −∞.
Moreover, b∗ is decreasing is σ and increasing in ρ. This implies that a DA
player posts higher bids than a WE player, for a given level of ρ.
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Cost.Other/Risk.Self (CO/RS)
In this condition, outcomes are pi1 = (8, 10), pi2 = (9, 10), pi3 = (10, 10),
pi4 = (11, 10), and pi5 = (12, 10). Decision makers post a bid b that maximizes
EU [b] = (1− PT (b))UNT +
∫ b
0
1
6
CRy(pi
∗
x(p)− p, pi∗y(p))dp (3.5)
Note that, since CRy(pix, piy) is increasing in piy for all feasible ρ and σ,
also in this case the optimal choice when cards are turned is pi∗(p) = pi5 for
all p. Thus the expected utility becomes:
EU [b] =
(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ) +
∫ b
0
1
6
[(1− ρ)12 + ρ(10− p)] dp (3.6)
that is a concave parabola with a global maximum in b∗ = 10−7ρ−3σ5ρ .
The optimal bid goes from b∗ = 0 when ρ = σ = 1 to b∗ = 6 when
σ ≤ 10−37ρ3 . Moreover, the optimal bid is decreasing both in rho and sigma.
This implies that a DA player posts higher bids than a WE player, for a given
level of ρ.
Cost.Self/Risk.Oth (CS/RO)
In this condition, outcomes are pi1 = (10, 8), pi2 = (10, 9), pi3 = (10, 10),
pi4 = (10, 11), and pi5 = (10, 12). The expected utility is given by
EU [b] = (1− PT (b))UNT +
∫ b
0
1
6
CRy(pi
∗
x(p), pi
∗
y(p)− p)dp (3.7)
Note that if σ ≥ 0 the function CRy(pix, piy) is increasing in pix and, hence,
the optimal choice when cards are turned is pi∗(p) = pi5 for all p. If instead
σ < 0 the function is decreasing in pix and hence the optimal choice when
cards are turned and price p is paid changes with p. In the following we
discuss separately the case of σ ≥ 0 and σ < 0.
For σ ≥ 0 the expected utility is
EU [b] =
(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ) +
∫ b
0
1
6
[(1− σ)(10− p) + σ12] dp (3.8)
that is a concave parabola with a global maximum in b∗ = 7σ+3ρ5(1−σ) .
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For σ < 0, the optimal choice pi∗(p) is as follows:
pi∗(p) =

pi3 = (10, 10) if p < ρ
ρ−σ
pi2 = (9, 10) if ρ
ρ−σ ≤ p < 2ρ−σρ−σ
pi1 = (8, 10) if 2ρ−σ
ρ−σ ≤ p
(3.9)
Hence we need to take into consideration the following intervals when tak-
ing the integral over p.
- p
0 1 2
ρ
ρ−σ
2ρ−σ
ρ−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi3 behind
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi2 ahead
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi2 behind
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi1 ahead
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi1 behind
The expected utility becomes
EU [b] =
(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ)+
+

∫ b
0
1
6
[(1− σ)(10− p) + σ10] dp if b < ρ
ρ−σ∫ ρ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− σ)(10− p) + σ10] dp+ ∫ b ρ
ρ−σ
1
6
[(1− ρ)(10− p) + ρ9] dp if ρ
ρ−σ ≤ b ≤ 1∫ ρ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− σ)(10− p) + σ10] dp+ . . .+ ∫ b1 16 [(1− σ)(10− p) + σ9] dp if 1 < b < 2ρ−σρ−σ∫ ρ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− σ)(10− p) + σ10] dp+ . . .+ ∫ b2ρ−σ
ρ−σ
1
6
[(1− ρ)(10− p) + ρ8] dp if 2ρ−σ
ρ−σ ≤ b ≤ 2∫ ρ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− σ)(10− p) + σ10] dp+ . . .+ ∫ b2 16 [(1− σ)(10− p) + σ8] dp if 2 < b
(3.10)
Note that the function is continuous and each equation is a concave parabola.11
The maxima of the parabolae in b are equal to 3ρ−3σ5(1−σ) ,
−2ρ−3σ
5(1−ρ) ,
3ρ−8σ
5(1−σ) ,
−7ρ−3σ
5(1−ρ) , and
3ρ−13σ
5(1−σ) , respectively.
Suppose that the maximum of the parabola defined in equation i is in
the interval where equation i defines EU . Obviously, this point is also a
local maximum of the EU over that interval. Moreover, it easy to check that
equations j < i, i.e., the parabolae to the left of i, have their maximum to the
right of their intervals; while equations j > i, i.e., parabolae to the right of
i, have their maximum to the left of their intervals. This implies that EU is
increasing over the domain of equations j < i and decreasing over the domain
of equations j > i so the local maximum is the unique global maximum of EU.
11In each equation, b is present only in the common part
(
1− b
6
)
(50−3ρ+ 3σ) and in the
last integral.
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Given this, the optimal bid for σ < 0 is the following:
b∗ =

3ρ−3σ
5(1−σ) if
ρ−
√
60ρ−35ρ2
6
< σ < 0
−2ρ−3σ
5(1−ρ) if ρ− 53 ≤ σ ≤
ρ−
√
60ρ−35ρ2
6
3ρ−8σ
5(1−σ) if
−5+ρ−
√
25+110ρ−35ρ2
6
< σ < ρ− 5
3
−7ρ−3σ
5(1−ρ) if ρ− 103 ≤ σ ≤
−5+ρ−
√
25+110ρ−35ρ2
6
3ρ−13σ
5(1−σ) if σ < ρ− 103
(3.11)
Note that the optimal bid for σ < 0 is a continuous function and it is
a continuous function also considering the optimal bids when σ ≥ 0.12 The
optimal bid goes from b∗ = 0 when ρ = σ = 0 to b∗ = 6 when ρ > 0.75 and
σ ≥ 30−ρ37 .
The behavior of the optimal bid with respect to ρ is not univocal. Indeed,
while the bid is increasing in ρ on the “odd” intervals, on the “even” intervals
its behavior depends on the value of sigma. The behavior of the optimal bid
with respect to sigma is smoother: b∗ is decreasing in σ on all the intervals for
σ < 0, while it is increasing in σ for σ > 0. When comparing DA and WE, the
ordering of b∗ for the two types strictly depends on the level of σ, for a given
ρ. Thus, no sharp predictions can be drawn in this condition for distinct types.
Cost.Oth/Risk.Oth (CO/RO)
In this condition, outcomes are pi1 = (10, 8), pi2 = (10, 9), pi3 = (10, 10),
pi4 = (10, 11), and pi5 = (10, 12). Decision makers post a bid b that maximizes
EU [b] = (1− PT (b))UNT +
∫ b
0
1
6
CRy(pi
∗
x(p), pi
∗
y(p)− p)dp (3.12)
As before, since the CR function is increasing in pix only if σ ≥ 0, the
optimal choice pi∗(p) is pi5 for σ ≥ 0 and it changes with p for σ < 0.
In the first case, i.e., for σ ≥ 0, the expected utility is
EU [b] =

(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ) + ∫ b0 16 [(1− σ)10 + σ(12− p)] dp if b < 2(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ) + ∫ 20 16 [(1− σ)(10) + σ(12− p)] dp+
+
∫ b
2
1
6
[(1− ρ)10 + ρ(12− p)] dp if b ≥ 2
(3.13)
Note that the function is continuous and the two equations are a concave
parabolae with maxima in b = 7σ+3ρ5σ and b =
−3σ+13ρ
5ρ respectively. Note also
12It is easy to check that, at the interval boundaries, b∗ has the same value when ap-
proaching from the left and from the right.
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that the maximum of the first parabola is in b < 2 only if σ > ρ which is
never the case. So expected utility is increasing in b for b < 2. Moreover, the
maximum of the second parabola is always in b ≥ 2 (recall σ ≤ ρ) and hence
there is a unique global maximum in b∗ = −3σ+13ρ5ρ .
In the second case, i.e., for σ < 0, the optimal choice pi∗(p) is as follows:
pi∗(p) =

pi3 = (10, 10) if p ≤ − σ
ρ−σ
pi4 = (11, 10) if − σ
ρ−σ < p ≤ − 2σ−ρρ−σ
pi5 = (12, 10) if − 2σ−ρ
ρ−σ < p
(3.14)
Hence we need to take into consideration the following intervals when tak-
ing the integral over p.
- p
0 1 2− σρ−σ −2σ−ρρ−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi3 ahead
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi4 behind
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi4 ahead
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi5 behind
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi5 ahead
The expected utility becomes
EU [b] =
(
1− b
6
)
(50− 3ρ+ 3σ)+
+

∫ b
0
1
6
[(1− ρ)10 + ρ(10− p)] dp if b ≤ − σ
ρ−σ∫− σ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− ρ)10 + ρ(10− p)] dp+ ∫ b− σ
ρ−σ
1
6
[(1− σ)10 + σ(11− p)] dp if ρ
ρ−σ < b < 1∫− σ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− ρ)10 + ρ(10− p)] dp+ . . .+ ∫ b1 16 [(1− ρ)10 + ρ(11− p)] dp if 1 ≤ b ≤ − 2σ−ρρ−σ∫− σ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− ρ)10 + ρ(10− p)] dp+ . . .+ ∫ b− 2σ−ρ
ρ−σ
1
6
[(1− σ)10 + σ(12− p)] dp if − 2σ−ρ
ρ−σ < b < 2∫− σ
ρ−σ
0
1
6
[(1− ρ)10 + ρ(10− p)] dp+ . . .+ ∫ b2 16 [(1− ρ)10 + ρ(12− p)] dp if 2 ≤ b
(3.15)
Note that, also in this case the function is continuous and each equation is
a parabola. However, while the equations in the odd cases are concave parabo-
lae, the equations in the even cases are convex parabolae.13 This implies that
there cannot be a maximum for b in the intervals
(
− σρ−σ , 1
)
and
(
−2σ−ρρ−σ , 2
)
.
The vertexes of the parabolae are, respectively in 3ρ−3σ5ρ ,
3ρ+2σ
5σ ,
8ρ−3σ
5ρ ,
3ρ+7σ
5σ ,
and 13ρ−3σ5ρ .
Moreover, note that for the feasible values of ρ and σ: (i) the vertex of
the second parabola, which is in 3ρ+2σ5σ , is always to the left of − σρ−σ ; (ii) the
vertex of the fourth parabola, which is in 3ρ+7σ5σ , is always to the left of −2σ−ρρ−σ ;
(iii) the vertex of the first parabola, which is in 3ρ−3σ5ρ , is always to the right of
− σρ−σ ; (iv) the vertex of the third parabola, which is in 8ρ−3σ5ρ , is always to the
right of −2σ−ρρ−σ . This implies that the EU function is increasing for b in the
13This because in equation 2 and 4 the coefficient of b2 is − σ
12
which is positive.
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interval [0, 2). Finally, the vertex of the fifth parabola—which is concave—is
in b = 13ρ−3σ5ρ that is bigger than 2 if ρ > σ that is always the case. Hence,
the unique global maximum is for b∗ = 13ρ−3σ5ρ that is the same optimal bid
obtained for σ ≥ 0.
The optimal bid goes from b∗ = 2 when ρ = σ to b∗ = 6 when σ ≤ −17ρ3 .
Moreover, the optimal bid is decreasing in sigma while it is increasing in rho
for σ > 0 and decreasing in rho for σ < 0. Thus, similar to what happens in
CO/RS, a DA player posts higher bids than a WE player, for a given ρ.
Comparison of optimal bids across treatments
Here we compare optimal bids across conditions. Figure 3.6.1 shows an
example of the optimal bids as a function of σ in the four treatments. In
the figure it is assumed that the agent has a ρ = 0.3. The continuous lines
identify conditions in which risk is borne by the decision maker (·/RS) and
the dashed lines conditions in which risk is borne by the other (·/RO); the
blue lines identify conditions in which the cost is borne by the decision maker
(CS/·) and the red lines conditions in which the cost is borne by the other
(CO/·).
We start by comparing the bids b∗ when risk is shifted from the decision
maker to the other agent. Thus, we compare i) b∗CS/RS and b
∗
CS/RO and ii)
b∗CO/RS and b
∗
CO/RO. We obtain that
• for CO/·, we have that b∗ when the risk is borne by the decision maker is
bigger than b∗ when the risk borne by the other when 10−7ρ−3σ5ρ ≥ 13ρ−3σ5ρ ,
i.e., when ρ ≤ 0.5.
• for CS/·, we need to compare b∗ when the risk is borne by the decision
maker, i.e., 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) with all the cases of b
∗ when the risk is borne by
the other.
We start with σ < 0. In this case it is easy to check that, on the
odd intervals, 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) is always bigger than b
∗ when the risk is borne
by the other. Consider now the interval
[
ρ− 53 ,
ρ−
√
60ρ−35ρ2
6
]
, and as-
sume 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) <
−2ρ−3σ
5(1−ρ) . This implies that σ <
11ρ−10−
√
85ρ2−280ρ+220
6 .
However, this quantity is smaller than ρ − 53 ; so the optimal bid when
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Figure 3.6.1: Optimal bids b∗(ρ = .3)
The blue solid line represents the optimal bid for CS/RS; the blue dashed line represents
the optimal bid for CS/RO; the red solid line represents the optimal bid for CO/RS; the
red dashed line represents the optimal bid for CO/RO.
the risk is borne by the decision maker is bigger than the optimal bid
when risk is borne by the other player also on the second interval. Con-
sider the fourth interval, i.e.,
[
ρ− 103 ,
−5+ρ−
√
25+110ρ−35ρ2
6
]
, and sup-
pose 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) <
−7ρ−3σ
5(1−ρ) . This implies that σ <
6ρ−10−√220−120ρ
6 but
this contradicts σ ≥ ρ − 103 and, hence, also on the fourth interval the
optimal bid when the risk is borne by the decision maker is bigger than
the optimal bid when risk is borne by the other player.
For σ ≥ 0 we have that 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) ≥ 7σ+3ρ5(1−σ) is satisfied when σ ≤ 0.5.
Given that σ ≤ ρ by assumption, ρ ≤ 0.5 is a sufficient condition to
ensure that the optimal bid when the risk is borne by the decision maker
is bigger than the optimal bid when the risk is borne by the other player.
To summarize, any decision maker, irrespective of her social preferences,
is going to bid higher when risk is borne by her than when risk is borne by the
other, keeping fixed the subject paying to turn the cards. If we (reasonably)
assume ρ ≤ 0.5, we can completely rank the bids in the four experimental
conditions by knowing that the optimal bid in CS/RS is always smaller than
the optimal bid in CO/RO, i.e. 13ρ−3σ5ρ ≥ 10+3ρ−13σ5(1−σ) when σ ≤ ρ and ρ ≤ 0.5.
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Then, for a given level of ρ, we predict the following rank in optimal bids:
b∗CO/RS ≥ b∗CO/RO ≥ b∗CS/RS ≥ b∗CS/RO. Moreover, in CO/RS and CO/RO
we should observe b∗ ≥ 2, while in CS/RS and CS/RO we should observe
b∗ ≤ 2.6. As shown also by Figure 3.6.1, this implies that the difference
between optimal bids is more pronounced when shifting the cost from the
decision maker to the other than when shifting the risk.
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Chapter 4
Tell Me How to Rule:
Leadership, Delegation and
Voice in Cooperation
with Marco Faillo and Luigi Mittone
4.1 Introduction
Cooperation in finitely repeated Public Good experiments has been widely
tested during the past, producing results that, in general, have generated
discrepancies from standard economic theories. According to these, subjects
should never contribute to the Public Good, as this strategy does not represent
an equilibrium. Experimental evidence (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Chaudhuri,
2011) shows that the general tendency in Public Good games is for subjects
to start contributing an amount within the 40 and 60% of their endowments
and, as the game proceeds, to decrease contribution. One of the causes of
such a decay is often attributed to the end-game effect : when approaching
the end of a finite game, subjects tend to reason using backward induction
and to free ride. Yet, an alternative theory is that subjects, during the game,
go through a learning process and adapt their behavior, changing strategy
(Isaac and Walker, 1988). Such a decay in contribution is not observed when
punishment is implemented (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
More recently, studies involving public good experiments have driven the
attention to leadership and its effects on cooperation tasks. Gu¨th et al. (2007)
proved that leadership affects intra-group cooperation. The authors imple-
mented a leadership by example mechanism, where leaders are first movers
and followers can imitate their choices: results show that the presence of a
first mover-leader cause a substantial improve in cooperation.
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A more recent study by Fleiß and Palan (2013) compares voluntary con-
tributions and leader-allocated contributions in public goods. Results show
that public-good games with allocators achieve higher levels of cooperation
and contribution. Furthermore, the authors prove that the majority of the
subjects taking part to their experiment is willing to delegate decisions to a
leader in order to exploit benefits of cooperation. Such being the case, lead-
ers could take advantage of their position to reap the benefits of cooperation,
choosing higher contributions for their follower and deciding to free ride. In
spite of this, the presence of a leader is usually beneficial for the economy of
a group.
Hamman, Weber, and Woon (2011), similarly, explain how centralized
decision-making is more efficient for the provision of a public-good. The au-
thors find among subjects a general necessity for actions coordination while
pursuing a common goal, especially in settings with large groups. Further-
more, the authors find that communication fosters coordination, by reducing
the problem of free-riding.
General evidence supports the hypothesis that leadership improves coop-
eration in social dilemmas; nevertheless, we are not aware of the effects that
leadership can have on cooperation game where leaders interact with each
others. In our experimental study, leaders represent their own groups inter-
acting into a public good game, but every choice they make directly falls back
on their followers, that have no decisional power. This experimental setting
differs from the ones used so far in this field, as we combine two different di-
mensions: leadership in coordination games, and delegated decision-making.
At the best of our knowledge, our experiment is the first aimed to inves-
tigate how delegated leaders, whose incentives are aligned to their followers’,
interact into a Public Good experiment. Most of the existing experiments
are aimed to test how leadership affect intra-group cooperation, meaning that
leaders are asked to interact only with their followers, leaving aside coopera-
tion between leaders.
In particular, we focus on the implementation of leadership with dictating
power, leaving aside the aspects of leadership by example (Gu¨th et al., 2007;
Levati, Sutter, and Heijden, 2007). Our study is mainly aimed to understand
whether leadership can help improve cooperation when individuals have to
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play a public good game, and they know that their actions directly affect
others: in this sense, leaders are responsible for their own group and are asked
to make delegated choices. As explained by Humphrey and Renner (2011),
when delegated agents have to interact with other individuals, the sense of
responsibility affects their choices, as they perceive their power to determine
others’ payoffs.
Similarly to what done in other experiments on cooperation in public goods
experiments, we included the possibility for subjects to implement punishment
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Egas and Riedl, 2005). Previous studies proved that,
depending on the cost, subjects punish more or less frequently, and that, in
general, punishment has a positive effect on cooperation: it is usually able to
increase contributions and to reduce free riding.
Hamman, Weber, and Woon (2011) found that subjects taking part in a
public good experiment show willingness to delegate their decisions only when
communication is allowed. Xiao and Houser (2009) and Ellingsen and Johan-
nesson (2008) provide evidence of the importance of one-sided communication
in dictator games: when recipients have voice, this works as a psychological
device that reduces dictators’ aggressiveness. Additional contributions to this
literature are provided by Capizzani et al. (2015) and Mittone and Musau
(2016), who find similar results testing communication in social dilemmas.
Following these findings, we decided to test the effect of communication in
our experimental setting, by adding an additional treatment where one-sided
communication is allowed at the end of each round.
Decisions made by subjects taking part to the treatments with simple
leadership and leadership with communication were compared to the ones ob-
tained in the public good game with punishment. The setting we implemented
is similar to the one used by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), that only differs in the
number of rounds.
Our findings demonstrate that contribution to the public good is, on aver-
age, higher in the treatment with leadership. The same can be said about the
use of punishment, which is implemented more frequently when leaders can de-
cide and communication is not allowed. The higher frequency of punishment,
though, jeopardizes the positive effects on efficiency derived from leadership,
so that results in terms of final payoff are better in groups with no leaders (i.e.
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our baseline), and in groups with leadership and communication.
We can say that, in our experimental setting, leadership has, overall, a
positive effect on contribution and cooperation. Nevertheless, communication
is a needed in order to push leaders to make choices that are actually benefi-
cial to their group. In addition to this, we find that implementing leadership
with communication it is possible to obtain average final payoffs that do not
significantly differ from the one obtained by subjects deciding individually.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Task
The experiment is based on a repeated Public Good game with free contri-
bution and punishment opportunities (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000), and consists
of three different treatments, applied in a between subjects fashion. In all
the treatments participants are divided into groups of 4 members each, and
every group plays a separate Public Good game over 20 rounds. Each round
consists of two phases. During the first (contribution) phase, subjects receive
an endowment E of 20 tokens, and have to choose how many of these they
want to allocate to the Public Good. Every token invested in the Public Good
is multiplied by 1.6 and then equally divided among the four members of the
group. At the end of this first phase, subjects are informed about their payoffs.
This is the sum of the tokens not allocated to the Public Good and a share
equal to the 40% of the total sum invested by the group: Thus, subject i ’s
payoff for the first phase is determined as follows:
pii,1 = (E − ci) + α ∗
∑4
i=1 ci,
where ci is subject i ’s contribution to the Public Good, and α is the Public
Good multiplication factor equal to 0.4. Subjects’ payoffs are all determined
in the same way and every member of a group receives the same share of the
Public Good.
After receiving information about their payoff, subjects enter the second
phase of the round and receive details about other members’ contributions.
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At this point, each group member can decide whether to reduce or leave un-
changed the payoffs obtained by every other member during the first phase of
the round. To do this, each subject can assign to his peers up to 10 points:
every point that participants receive reduces by 10% the payoff accumulated
in the first phase. Specifically, subjects can decide how many points they
want to assign to each one of their group members. If subjects do not want
to reduce others’ payoff they have to assign 0 points. Else, they can decide by
what percentage to reduce others’ payoff and choose the corresponding num-
ber of points. To assign points is costly and the price varies depending on the
number of points one wants to distribute. Within the experiment instructions,
subjects are provided with a table that summarizes the cost of points.
Table 4.1: Points Cost
POINTS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COST 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30
At the end of the second phase, subject i ’s payoff function is as follows:
pii,2 = pii,1 −
∑
j 6=i costij,2 − 0.10 ∗ pii,1(
∑
j 6=i pji,2),
where pii,1 is subject i ’s payoff at the end of the first phase, costij,2 is the
cost for the points assigned by subject i and pji,2 are the points assigned to
player i, both during the second phase.
By assigning 10 points to subjects, it is possible to reduce their first phase
payoff by 100%. Following the experimental structure by Fehr and Ga¨chter
(2000), in order to prevent negative payoffs, even if subjects can receive more
than 10 points, their payoff cannot be reduced by more than 100%. After
having chosen how many points to assign, subjects receive feedback about this
second phase and proceed to the following round. This procedure is repeated
for 20 rounds, then subjects are informed about their final payment, that is
equal to the sum of the payments obtained in the 20 rounds.
4.2.2 Treatments
The experiment consists of three different treatments: one serves as a baseline
and is a replication of Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), while the other two include
manipulations.
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We use the baseline to gather data about individuals average contributions
within the Public Good game described in the previous section. Average
contributions are used to drive a comparison with the ones obtained in the
two manipulation treatments.
The two manipulation treatments allow us to test two different factors:
the first is how the awareness of being responsible for others affect individual
decision making (treatment couple); and the second add to responsibility for
others, also an higher social pressure as cheap-talk is allowed (treatment chat).
In the treatment couple subjects are matched in four couples; thus, every
group is composed by eight members: four drawn participants and the four
participants they are paired with (henceforth followers); the composition of
couples and groups remain the same during the whole experiment.
Figure 4.1 represents a standard experimental session with 16 participants:
these are divided into two groups of four couples, each consisting of a leader
and a follower, represented by the black and the gray silhouette respectively.
The arrows explain how leaders of couples belonging to the same group interact
among each other, playing the Public Good game.
Figure 4.1: Group Structure - Couple
Each one of the 2 groups plays the 20 round Public Good game with pun-
ishment described in the previous section. Depending on the role participants
are assigned to, they are asked to perform a different task: in the first phase
of every round, drawn participants have to choose how much to contribute to
the common project, and in the second phase they can decide how many pun-
ishment points to assign to other group members; followers can only observe
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what drawn participants do, but they are asked to express their hypotheti-
cal choices as if they were drawn participants. This helps to keep them busy
and to keep private the identity of the drawn participants within the labora-
tory. As drawn participants decide for themselves and the participants they
are paired with, in the first phase their are given an endowment of 40 tokens
(i.e. double with respect to the one provided in the baseline). Tokens invested
in the common project are multiplied by 1.6 and equally divided among the 4
group members. Since in this treatment group members are, in fact, couples,
participants receive half of the payoff addressed to their couple, which is en-
tirely determined by the decisions made by the drawn participants. Once every
drawn participant has chosen how much to contribute, the first phase ends. At
the beginning of the second phase participants are informed about their group
contribution and drawn participants can decide to assign some points to other
group members. Similarly to what happens in the first phase, the costs of the
points is doubled (Table 4.2). Drawn participants are entitled to decide how
many points they want to assign, but the cost of this action is to be equally
divided among the members of the couple.
Table 4.2: Points Cost - Couple Treatment
POINTS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COST 0 2 4 8 12 18 24 32 40 50 60
Note that if a couple receives points both members are affected and their
payoffs decrease. After that all the drawn participants have decided how many
points to assign, all the participants receive updated feedback about their
payoff for the round and proceed. This procedure is repeated for 20 rounds,
then subjects are informed about their final payment and the experiment is
over.
The chat treatment is characterized by the same experimental setting uti-
lized for the couple treatment, with the addition of one feature: followers are
still asked to express their hypothetical decisions, but they can also send brief
communications the drawn participants their are paired with. Communication
of personal information, PC number, threats, promises of side payments and
the use of offensive language were prohibited.
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4.2.3 Participants and Procedures
The experiment was conducted in the Cognitive and Experimental Economics
Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. The experiment was designed
and administrated by using Borland Delphi.1 Participants recruited were, on
average, 23 years old second year students, 55% of them from the faculty of
economics, and 45% are females. On average, participants had taken part to
5 experiments before. The total number of subjects is 360, and they were
divided across treatments as shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Number of Participants
Treatment Sessions (Num.) Participants (Num.) Observations (Num.)
baseline 4 72 18
couple 10 160 20
chat 8 128 16
Total 22 360 54
Each subject received a 3.00 euros show-up fee, plus a sum that varied de-
pending on their performance in the experiment; this was, on average, equal
to 8 euros. Upon their arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer
and received instructions for the experiment, which also contain few compre-
hension questions; subjects had 7 minutes to read the instructions and try
to answer. Then, instructions were read aloud and the correct answer were
provided by one of the experimenters, who also answered any possible question.
4.2.4 Behavioral Predictions
With regard to the couple and the chat treatment, Charness and Jackson
(2009) report experimental evidence of the effects that being responsible for
someone’s payoff has on subjects. Specifically, the authors tested dictators’
leadership in a coordination game, finding that the majority of subjects showed
a greater risk aversion when responsible for others. This study have extended
the responsibility-alleviation effect (Charness, 2000) to the dimension of co-
ordination games, showing how the presence of a unique decision maker in a
1We express our sincere appreciation for Marco Tecilla’s support.
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two-persons group can work as an instrument to increase coordination and
welfare.
Additional evidence about leadership and cooperation in public good games
can be found is some recent experiments (among the others Fleiß and Palan,
2013; Bolle and Vogel, 2011). These, although have diverse experimental set-
tings and manipulations, are characterized by a common finding: leadership
improves cooperation.
With respect to the aspects described, and accordingly to our premises,
we formulate the following behavioral predictions:
Hypothesis 4.1 Contributions:
In all the three treatments participants will contribute to the Public Good.
Hypothesis 4.2 Social Welfare:
When representing a couple, subjects will invest more in the Public Good.
Hypothesis 4.3 Punishment:
Subjects will punish free-riders and low contributors; responsibility for others
increases the use of punishment.
Hypothesis 4.4 Communication:
In the treatment chat followers will communicate with leaders affecting their
decisions.
4.3 Results
This section includes an analysis divided into three main focus areas: con-
tributions, payoff and punishment. Note that, with regard to the treatments
couple and chat, we only use decisions made by individuals assigned the role of
drawn participants; in fact, as explained in the Methodology section, followers
were asked to express their decisions with the only aim of keeping them busy
during the experiment and preserving roles anonymity. In addition to this,
we include a section specifically addressed to the analysis of communication
in treatment chat.
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4.3.1 Contributions
Figure 4.1 shows the average percentage contribution to the Public Good per
round across the three treatments.
We observe both couple and chat treatments are characterized by higher
average contributions with respect to the baseline.
Result 4.1 In all the three treatments subjects contribute to the Public Good
investing positive sums.
Figure 4.1: Average Percentage Contribution per Round
The boxplot in Figure 4.2 provides more precise information about the
difference in the average percentage contributions across treatments.
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Figure 4.2: Average Percentage Contribution per Treatment
The three distributions seem to confirm the presence of a difference in
terms of contributions between the baseline and the other treatments. In the
baseline subjects have contributed on average with 48% of their endowment,
while in the couple and chat treatments average individual contributions are,
respectively, equal to 58% and 54% (black dots and numbers). Non-parametric
tests show a significant difference in contributions between the baseline and
couple treatments.2
Result 4.2 In all the three treatments contributions to the Public Good will
be, on average, positive.
Result 4.3 When deciding for others (and no communication is allowed),
subjects tend to invest more in the Public Good trying to increase their group
welfare.
2One-tailed tests on groups’ average values across rounds: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney, p-
value = 0.0834; Fligner-Policello, p-value = 0.0778.
80
Chapter 4. Tell Me How to Rule:
Leadership, Delegation and Voice in Cooperation
The difference between baseline and chat is not significant according to
non-parametric tests.3
4.3.2 Punishment
As for the level of punishment (figure 4.3), we find strictly positive values in
every treatment.
Figure 4.3: Average Points of Punishment per Round
In general, punishment seems to be implemented more frequently in treat-
ments with delegation, that do no significantly differ from each other4; this
suggests that subjects punish more when responsible for others.
As already pointed out in previous studies (Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter,
2008), it is possible to make a distinction between two different types of pun-
ishment: the altruistic punishment that aims to punish free-riders and low
3Nevertheless, figure 4.1 suggests that the first five rounds could be considered a transition
phase: couple contributions start around the 42%, while chat contributions start at 33% and
both quickly grow by 10 and 15 percentage points. Thus, we tried to repeat our tests
excluding data from these rounds. Results confirm our hypothesis; in fact, we find stronger
evidence of the difference between baseline and couple (One-tailed tests: Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney, p-value = 0.0739; Fligner-Policello, p-value = 0.0697), but results are still negative
for as concerns the chat treatment.
4Two-sidedWilcoxon-Mann-Whitney on group average across rounds: couple vs baseline
p-value = 0.0006; chat vs baseline p-value = 0.007; couple vs chat p-value = 0.13
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cooperators, and the so called antisocial punishment directed to cooperators.5
We found evidence of the implementation of both these forms of punishment.
Table 4.1: Average Points of Punishment Assigned
Treatment Points Assigned Antisocial (%)
baseline 1,06 21,2%
couple 2,69 18,2%
chat 1,76 14,5%
Points Assigned : average number of punishment points as-
signed; Antisocial (%): percentage of antisocial punishment
over the points assigned.
Values in table 4.1 represent the average number of points of punishment
assigned across treatments. In general, it is possible to observe how treatments
couple and chat are characterized by a greater use of punishment. As it was
already pointed out by the results of the non-parametric test, leaders punished
more than subjects in the baseline.
Result 4.4 Subjects punish free-riders and low contributors. Leadership in-
creases the use of punishment.
For as concerns antisocial punishment, our results are in line with previous
studies, but we observe a difference across the three treatments. Running a
non-parametric test we find that antisocial punishment in the treatment chat
is lower than in the baseline; furthermore, we observe that in the treatment
couple antisocial punishment is higher than in the chat one.6
4.3.3 Payoff
Our results suggest, so far, that decision makers in charge as leaders tend to
contribute more to the common project and also to punish more. Nevertheless,
we also find that these effects are weakened in the chat treatment. Thus,
in order to have a more clear understanding of subjects’ welfare, it is more
appropriate to focus on payoffs.
5Our experimental design is not aimed to investigate and provide an explanation to this
particular phenomenon; thus, we leave a deeper analysis to further studies.
6Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney on groups’ average: chat vs baseline p-value = 0.09;
chat vs couple p-value = 0.05.
82
Chapter 4. Tell Me How to Rule:
Leadership, Delegation and Voice in Cooperation
Figure 4.4: Average Payoff per Round
Figure 4.4 reports the average payoff at the end of every round; this means
that payoffs are taken after that punishment has occurred. Contrarily to what
found concerning contributions, here we observe that payoffs in the treatment
chat are higher than in the treatment couple. This suggests that, in spite of
the lower level of contributions, subjects decided to punish less in order to
preserve general welfare. Furthermore, payoffs in the baseline follow a flatter
pattern, but their level does not seem to differ from the other treatments.
More details are provided by the following box plot (figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Average Payoff per Treatment
The mean in the treatment chat is higher than in the treatment couple,
but what is more interesting is that the highest mean value is associated to
the baseline. As already explained, responsibility for others has the effect of
increasing efficiency, thus we can use a one-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test on groups’ average values across rounds, which confirms that the individ-
ual average payoff is, indeed, higher in treatments baseline (p-value = 0.0559)
and chat (p-value = 0.0580) rather than in couple.
This finding is particularly relevant as it suggests that, in our experimental
setting, leadership can be used to enhance social welfare only in presence
of communication; in fact, in spite of having contributed more on average,
subjects in the couple treatment had up a significant part of their group’s
welfare in order to actively sustain cooperation.
4.3.4 Chat
In the treatment chat, followers were allowed to send brief messages to the
drawn participant they were paired to. 67.19% of the 64 followers has used the
chat at least once during the 20 rounds, for a total number of messages equal
to 554. We have categorized these into 5 types of communication: suggestions
to increase or decrease the contribution, suggestions to increase or decrease
84
Chapter 4. Tell Me How to Rule:
Leadership, Delegation and Voice in Cooperation
the punishment, and other messages. In addition to this, we checked whether
the message was effective by monitoring drawn participants’ behavior in the
following round; we decided to leave aside messages of the category other, as
their efficacy cannot be categorized and their content is not aimed to influence
leaders’ decisions. Table 4.2 provides data of the analysis.
Table 4.2: Chat
Effective
Message No Yes Total
increase contribution 28 97 125
decrease contribution 21 63 84
increase punishment 7 12 19
decrease punishment 8 31 39
Total 64 203 267
In details, 36% of the total number of messages analyzed in table 4.2
suggested, successfully, to increase the contribution (against 10% suggesting
a decrease). The number of messages related to punishment is, in general,
lower, but it is still possible to observe how the 24% of those led to a decrease
in punishment.7
The overall effectiveness rate is equal to 76%, which suggests that drawn
participants’ actions were partly driven by their peers’ suggestions. This is
particularly relevant as it seems, looking at our results, that the use of chat
helped manage resources more carefully; in fact, in the treatment couple we
do observe higher contribution, but the use of punishment is so high that it
jeopardizes any benefit.
Result 4.5 Followers communicate using the chat and this affects the decision
maker.
4.3.5 Regressions
Table 4.3 presents three models the determinants of the dependent variable in-
dividual contribution of two models obtained from a Arellano Bond regression:
the use of this model is required by the dynamic nature of our experimental
data.
7We ran Z-tests on proportions to compare, respectively, messages suggesting to increase
or decrease contribution, and messages suggesting to increase or decrease punishment: both
tests rejected the null hypothesis.
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Model 1 contains two dummy variables, treatment couple and treatment
chat (respectively referred to the treatments we applied), a time variable,
round, and five lagged variables: contribution t-1 is the individual contri-
bution, group average contrib t-1 is the group average contribution, given
punishment t-1 and received punishment t-1 are the punishments given and
received, and group antisocial t-1 is the group average antisocial punishment.
Model 2 has the same body, but we added four control variables: gender
and age are demographic information, major is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the subject is a student of the faculty of Economics,and experience is the
number of experiments at which the subjects had taken part.
Treatment Chat only refers to leaders’ contribution in the treatment with
communication, and includes two dummy variables: chat increase contrib t-
1 indicates that the leader, at the end of the previous round, has received
a message by her follower, suggesting to increase their couple’s contribution;
chat decrease contrib t-1 indicates that the leader, at the end of the previous
round, has received a message by her follower, suggesting to decrease their
couple’s contribution. These variables are equal to one only when messages
were successful, i.e. when leaders adapted their contributions according to the
messages received.8
8See section Chat for more details.
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Table 4.3: Leader’s Contribution Determinants - Arellano Bond Model
Model 1 Model 2 Treatment Chat
Individual Contribution
treatment couple 0.277 (0.11)
∗
0.220 (0.12)
treatment chat 0.262 (0.11)
∗
0.491 (0.12)
∗
round −0.026 (0.01)∗∗ −0.023 (0.01)∗ −0.036 (0.02)∗
contribution t-1 0.194 (0.02)
∗∗∗
0.188 (0.02)
∗∗∗
0.405 (0.03)
∗
group average contrib t-1 0.752 (0.02)
∗∗∗
0.755 (0.02)
∗∗∗
0.546 (0.03)
∗∗∗
given punishment t-1 −0.009 (0.02) 0.000 (0.02) −0.038 (0.03)
received punishment t-1 0.060 (0.03)
∗
0.064 (0.03)
∗ −0.028 (0.05)
group antisocial t-1 −0.006 (0.00) −0.006 (0.00) 0.011 (0.01)
gender 0.100 (0.09) −0.184 (0.15)
age −0.028 (0.02) −0.060 (0.04)
major −0.332 (0.09)∗∗∗ −0.243 (0.17)
experience 0.064 (0.01)
∗∗∗
0.081 (0.03)
chat increase contrib t-1 3.180 (0.30)
∗∗∗
chat decrease contrib t-1 −2.969 (0.36)∗∗∗
cons 0.820 (0.15)
∗∗∗
1.225 (0.48)
∗
2.455 (0.98)
∗
Number of obs. 4104 4104 1216
Wald Chi-sq 15146.18 15324.55 6145.03
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
treatment couple and treatment chat are dummies indicating the treatment applied, contri-
bution t-1 is the individual contribution in the previous round, group average contrib t-1 is
average contribution by group in the previous round, given punishment t-1 is the punish-
ment subject used in the previous round, received punishment t-1 is the punishment subject
received in the previous round, group antisocial t-1 is the average antisocial punishment
used in the previous round by the group, experience is the number of experiments the sub-
jects took part to, chat increase contrib t-1 and chat decrease contrib t-1 indicates whether
leaders received a successful message suggesting, respectively, to increase or decrease their
contribution.
In general, our models seem not to differ widely both in terms of parameters
and their significance. The treatments dummy variables are both significant
in Model 1, supporting the idea that leadership has the effect to increase
contribution in our experimental setting. In Model 2, the dummy related
to the treatment couple loses significance: this may be caused by the larger
number of independent variables included.
The variable round has a negative coefficient in all the models, and this
seems to conflict with the trend observed in figure 4.1; nevertheless, as the
lagged individual contribution variable is always positive, the presence of a
negative parameter related to the variable round suggests that there is a flat-
tening in contributions as the game proceeds.
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The average group contribution in the previous round positively affect in-
dividual contributions, so that, to some extent, we could say that cooperation
sustains itself. Similarly, in models 1 and 2 punishment received in the pre-
vious round has a positive effect on individual contribution. This effect is
not observed in the treatment Chat : an explanation can be found in the high
significance of the coefficient related to the variable chat decrease contrib t-1.
This suggests that followers’ messages were taken into account by leaders, even
when causing the couple to incur punishment.
In addition to this, we find that also the coefficient of the other dummy
variable related to chat, chat increase contrib t-1, is highly significant, sup-
porting our result that points out the efficacy of the use of communication
between followers and leaders.
For as regards our control variables, we only observe significant effects in
Model 2: Economics students tend to contribute less than others, while people
with more experience in laboratory experiments contribute more to the Public
Good.
4.4 Conclusion
Following some recent work aimed to study leadership and cooperation (Ham-
man, Weber, and Woon, 2011; Bolle and Vogel, 2011; Gu¨th et al., 2007), we
test in a laboratory experiment the effects of leadership on intra-group co-
operation, combining this condition with delegated choices. Specifically, we
investigate whether leadership is beneficial when, in addition of being respon-
sible for others, leaders are also asked to cooperate among themselves. This
aspect is particularly interesting and, at the best of our knowledge, have not
been tested experimentally yet. Furthermore, we compare a situation where
leaders decide independently to another where their followers are allowed to
send short messages.
Our main finding is that, when there is no communication, leaders tend
to contribute more to the public good, but also to make an undue use of pun-
ishment; the latter aspect is true when referring to both altruistic punishment
and antisocial punishment. When followers are allowed to communicate with
their leaders, providing their opinion about the choices made in the round just
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concluded, it is possible to observe a decrease in contributions and punishment,
such that they do not significantly differ from the average ones observed in
our baseline.
In terms of final payoffs, although leaders contribute and cooperate more
in the treatment couple, we observe, on average, higher earnings in the base-
line and in the treatment chat. This result suggests that the responsibility
for others that leaders perceive when contributing to determine others’ pay-
offs incentivizes them to cooperate more, but also to punish more, with the
aim of preventing other leaders from compromising their effort. Nevertheless,
punishment is used without considering the consequences, so that the effects
of higher contributions are jeopardized.
From this perspective, it is possible to reduce punishment9 and obtain
higher final payoffs providing followers with the possibility of communicating
with leaders they are matched with. We find that results from the treatment
with leadership and communication produces very similar results to the public
good game with punishment we use as baseline.
This evidence suggests that leadership itself may be, in some cases, more
harmful rather than beneficial; in fact, decision makers, moved by their sense of
responsibility for others’, seem not to be always able to correctly decide. When
followers have voice, leaders tend to be less aggressive because communication
works as a trigger that relieves the psychological pressure of responsibility
(Xiao and Houser, 2009; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008): this, in our case,
reduces the use of punishment and produces an increase in efficiency.
To summarize, we can conclude that, in our experimental setting, a nor-
mative leadership where leaders have dictatorial power increases, on average,
contributions to the public good, but, because of leaders’ aggressiveness in the
use of punishment, does not produce beneficial effects on final payoffs. On the
other hand, implementing a “weakened dictatorship” where communication
is allowed, it is possible to obtain meaningful results in terms of both coop-
eration and efficiency, preventing waste of resources deriving from individual
aggressiveness.
9As explained in the section Punishment, the treatment chat does not significantly differ
from the treatment couple; yet, as observed in figure 4.3, the number of points assigned
seems to be smaller.
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Our experimental results are interesting as they contribute to an unex-
plored dimension, shedding light on leaders’ interaction and responsibility for
others in a cooperation game. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind
that we only provide a preliminary analysis. Further experiments should aim
to investigate the interaction between leaders in order to provide useful in-
sights and find how a greater cooperation could be achieved: this aspect could
be relevant also for purposes regarding external validity.
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4.5 Appendix - Experimental Instructions
Following we include an English translation of the experiment instructions.
Our experimental design required us to produce three different version of the
instructions (i.e. one for each treatment). General instructions were common,
while instructions for the remaining part of the experiment were edited to
match the structure of our treatments.
As explained in the section on the experimental task, the main differences
in our experiment occur between the baseline and the treatments couple and
chat. These latter, in fact, do not differ much from each other.
What follows is a full version of the instructions we used for the exper-
imental sessions. Any time there will be an edited part, it will be noticed,
specifying to which treatment we are referring (baseline, couple, or chat). May
the instructions be common to all the treatments, this will indicated as well
(common).
General Instructions
[common] Good morning, thanks for having accepted to participate to
this experiment. You are taking part to a study on decisions in the economic
environment. During the experiment you will have the opportunity to gain
money. At this sum we will add 3 euros for your participation. Your payment
will depends on your decisions and on other participants’ decisions. The an-
swers you give and the choices you make will be absolutely anonymous. The
experimenters will not be able to associate your choices and your answers to
your name. During the whole experiment we kindly ask you not to commu-
nicate with the other participants (otherwise, you will be excluded from the
experiment) and to pay attention to the instructions that will be shown on
your monitor and will be read aloud by one of the experimenter. May you
have any question, ask the experimenters.
[common] Your payoff will be calculated in tokens: each token corresponds
to 2 euro cents. At the end of the experiment we will ask you to fill a short
questionnaire and we will proceed to the payment, that will be made in cash.
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THE PARTICIPANTS
[baseline] Participants to the experiment are divided into 4 groups. The
composition of groups is the same during the whole experiment. Thus, your
group will be composed, in addition to you, by other three persons, whose
identity you will not know.
[couple, chat ] This experiment has 16 participants, divided into 8 couples.
The composition of couples remains the same during the whole experiment.
Thus, your couple will be made by you and another person, whose identity
will remain unknown to you. In every couple, one of the participants will
be randomly assigned the role of drawn participants. The drawn participant
in your couple will interact with the drawn participants of other three cou-
ples according to the procedure described below. Your couple belongs to a
group consisting of four couples. These groups are two, and their composition
remains unchanged during the whole experiment (Figure 4.5.1).
Figure 4.5.1: Group Structure
[common] The experiment is divided into 20 rounds. In each round the
other member of the group will not be identified by any name, so that their
choices cannot be identified either.
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THE PHASES
Each round is composed of 2 phases.
Phase 1
[baseline] At the beginning of each round every participants receives 20
tokens. We will call this sum “endowment”. You will have to decide how to
use your endowment. In particular you will have to decide ow many of the
20 tokens to utilize to contribute to a project and how many you of them you
want to keep for yourself. The other members of the group will have to do the
same.
The tokens invested in the project will be multiplied by a yield of 1.6 and
equally divided between the 4 members of the group.
At the end of phase 1, you will be given information about your earning,
that consists of two elements:
A The part of the initial 20 tokens that you decided to keep for yourself
(meaning 20 tokens minus the contribution to the project);
B Your payment deriving from the project, which is equal to 40% of the
sum of the four members’ contributions.
Then, your earning at the end of phase 1 is computed by the computer as
follows:
Your earnings at the end of phase 1 =
(20 tokens - contribution to the project) +
40% * (members’ total contribution to the project)
[couple, chat ] At the beginning of each round every participants receives
40 tokens. We will call this sum “endowment”. The drawn participant of each
couple has to decide how to use your endowment. In particular she will have
to decide ow many of the 40 tokens to utilize to contribute to a project and
how many you of them you want to keep for yourself. The other members of
the group will have to do the same.
The tokens invested in the project will be multiplied by a yield of 1.6 and
equally divided between the 4 couples of the group.
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At the end of phase 1, you will be given information about your couple’s
earning, that consists of two elements:
A The part of the initial 40 tokens that the drawn participant decided to
keep for your couple (meaning 40 tokens minus the contribution to the
project);
B Your payment deriving from the project, which is equal to 40% of the
sum of the four couples’ contributions in your group.
Then, your earning at the end of phase 1 is computed by the computer as
follows:
Your couple earnings at the end of phase 1 =
(40 tokens - contribution to the project) +
40% * (couples’ total contribution to the project)
[baseline] Each group member’s earnings are computed in the same way;
furthermore, each couple receives the same payment from the project.
[couple, chat ] Each couple’s earnings are computed in the same way; fur-
thermore, each participant receives the same payment from the project.
[baseline] Imagine, for instance, that in your group one member contributes
with 10 tokens, another contributes with 8 tokens, a third member contributes
with 12 tokens and you decide to contribute with 10 tokens. The total group
contribution is then 40 tokens. So, each member of the group receives from
the project a sum equal to 40% of 40 tokens = 16 tokens. The earnings for
the 4 members will be:
• first participant: 20− 10 + 16 = 26
• second participant: 20− 8 + 16 = 28
• third participant: 20− 12 + 16 = 24
• fourth participants: 20− 10 + 16 = 26
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[couple, chat ] Imagine, for instance, that in your group the drawn partic-
ipants of the first couple contributes with 10 tokens, the second couple’s one
contributes with 8 tokens, the third couple’s one contributes with 12 tokens
and your couple’s drawn participants decides to contribute with 10 tokens.
The total group contribution is then 40 tokens. So, each couple of the group
receives from the project a sum equal to 40% of 40 tokens = 16 tokens. The
earnings for the 4 couples will be:
• first couple: 40− 10 + 16 = 46
• second couple: 40− 8 + 16 = 48
• third couple: 40− 12 + 16 = 44
• fourth couple: 40− 10 + 16 = 46
[common] The software will always display the number of the current round
and the earnings accumulated until that moment.
Phase 2
[baseline] At the beginning of Phase 2 you can observe how much the other
group members have contributed to the project. At this point each member
of the group can decide to reduce or leave unvaried other members’ phase 1
earnings, by assigning points, up to a maximum of 10 points. Each of the point
assigned reduces by 10% the phase 1 earnings of the participant who receives
it. Thus, if you decide to assign 0 points to another group member, you will not
modify that participant’s earnings. If you assign 1 point you will reduce that
participant’s earnings by 10%. If a person receives in total 4 points, her phase
1 earnings will be reduced by 40%. If the person receives 10 or more points
her earnings will be reduced by 100%. Assigning points has a cost, which
depends on the number of points you decide to assign.
The table shows the correspondence between the number of points assigned
and the cost to pay.
POINTS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COST 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30
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For instance, if you decide to assign 1 point to a member of your group and
3 points to a second member, the earning of the first person will be reduced
by 10% while the earning of the second will be reduced by 30%. The cost you
have to pay in total is equal to 1 token (for 1 point) + 4 tokens (for 3 points).
Your earning at the end of Phase 2 is computed as follows:
Your earnings at the end of Phase 2 =
earning at the end of Phase 1 -
cost of points assigned in Phase 2 -
0.10 * (points received in Phase 2) *
(earning at the end of Phase 1)
Note that if you receive 10 points, your earning in Phase 1 will be reduced
by 100%. The maximum reduction is, anyways, equal to 100%, also in the
case you received more than 10 points. Note also that at the end of Phase 2
your earning can be negative. This happens when the cost of the points you
have decided to assign is higher than your earning. If you pay attention it will
not be hard to avoid this.
[couple, chat ] At the beginning of Phase 2 you can observe how much
the other couples have contributed to the project. At this point each drawn
participants can decide to reduce or leave unvaried other couples’ phase 1
earnings, by assigning points, up to a maximum of 10 points. Each of the
point assigned reduces by 10% the phase 1 earnings of the couple that re-
ceives it. Thus, if the drawn participants decides to assign 0 points to an-
other group member, she will not modify that participant’s earnings. If she
assigns 1 point she will reduce that participant’s earnings by 10%. If a cou-
ple receives in total 4 points, its phase 1 earnings will be reduced by 40%.
If the couple receives 10 or more points its earnings will be reduced by 100%.
Assigning points has a cost, which depends on the number of points the drawn
participants decides to assign.
The table shows the correspondence between the number of points assigned
and the cost to pay.
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POINTS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COST 0 2 4 8 12 18 24 32 40 50 60
For instance, if the drawn participants decides to assign 1 point to a couple
of your group and 3 points to a second couple, the earnings of the first couple
will be reduced by 10% while the earnings of the second will be reduced by
30%. The cost your couple has to pay in total is equal to 2 token (for 1 point)
+ 8 tokens (for 3 points).
Your couple’s earnings at the end of Phase 2 are computed as follows:
Your couple’s earnings at the end of Phase 2 =
earning at the end of Phase 1 -
cost of points assigned in Phase 2 -
0.10 * (points received in Phase 2) *
(earning at the end of Phase 1)
Note that if your couple receives 10 points, Phase 1 earnings will be re-
duced by 100%. The maximum reduction is, anyways, equal to 100%, also in
the case your couple received more than 10 points. Note also that at the end
of Phase 2 your couple’s earnings can be negative. This happens when the
cost of the points the drawn participants have decided to assign is higher than
your couple’s earnings. If you pay attention it will not be hard to avoid this.
[common]Any negative payoff at the end of the experiment will be bal-
anced by using your show-up fee, which will then be reduced by an amount
equal to the suffered loss. May the loss be higher than the show-up fee your
payment at the end of the experiment will be equal to zero.
[couple, chat ] THE NOT-DRAWN PARTICIPANTS
[couple, chat ] During the experiment the members of the couples who have
not been drawn as drawn participants will observe the choices of their drawn
participants and will obtain information about the other couples’ contribution
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level and about assigned and received points. In addition to this, during ev-
ery round they will be asked to express their choices as if they where drawn
participants, both in terms of contribution and points giving.
[chat ] Furthermore, at the end of every round they will have the opportu-
nity to send a message to the drawn participants. The message will have to
be inherent to the experiment activity, and shall not contain information that
may reveal the sender’s identity, nor offensive and rude statements.
FINAL PAYMENT
[baseline] At the end of the experiment you will be informed about your
total payment, to which it is added the 3 euros participation fee.
[couple, chat ] At the end of the experiment you will be informed about
your couple’s total payment. Your personal payment will correspond to half
of that sum, to which it is added the 3 euros participation fee.
CONTROL QUESTIONS
[baseline]
1. Participants are divided into groups of .......... people each.
2. The composition of groups remains the same during the whole exper-
iment, so you will always interact with the same people. [ ] True [ ]
False
3. Phase 1: your contribution is equal to 10 tokens and other group mem-
bers’ contributions are: 10, 5, 0. Your earning will be: ..........
4. If your earning in Phase 1 is equal to 20 tokens and you receive 5 points,
your earning will be then equal to: ..........
5. If you assign to the other three members of your group the following
points: 2, 3, 5, the total cost of the points will be equal to: ..........
[couple, chat ]
1. Participants are divided into .......... couples and .......... groups.
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2. Your couple interacts with other .......... couples.
3. The composition of groups remains the same during the whole experi-
ment, so your couple will always interact with the same couples. [ ] True
[ ] False
4. Phase 1: your couple drawn participant ’s contribution is equal to 10
tokens and other couple drawn participants’ contributions are: 20, 10, 0.
Your couple’s earning will be: ..........
5. If your couple’s earning in Phase 1 is equal to 30 tokens and you receive
5 points, your couple’s earning will be then equal to: ..........
6. If the drawn participant assigns to the other three couples of your group
the following points: 2, 3, 5, the total cost of the points will be equal to:
..........
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4.6 Appendix - Data
Following, we provide mean values of the most relevant variables used for
our analysis (Table 4.6.1). Data are organized by treatment and by group.
Table 4.6.1: Individual Average Values per Group
Treatment Group Contribution (SD) Punishment (SD) Payoff (SD)
baseline 1 16.688 (3.922) .500 (.827) 27.740 (3.535)
baseline 2 18.225 (3.114) .275 (.616) 29.741 (2.594)
baseline 3 3.775 (3.822) .500 (.914) 20.544 (3.135)
baseline 4 3.375 (3.491) .163 (.462) 21.454 (3.272)
baseline 5 5.975 (2.199) .313 (.587) 22.488 (2.375)
baseline 6 1.675 (3.133) .663 (1.330) 18.852 (3.122)
baseline 7 12.113 (2.506) .475 (1.055) 25.798 (2.521)
baseline 8 15.275 (4.503) 2.800 (2.291) 17.570 (3.634)
baseline 9 14.013 (5.290) 2.138 (2.448) 19.1753 (9.737)
baseline 10 14.588 (4.995) 2.975 (2.873) 16.656 (8.186)
baseline 11 2.213 (3.883) .913 (1.995) 18.028 (3.949)
baseline 12 3.788 (3.828) .288 (.7826) 21.202 (3.399)
baseline 13 15.988 (4.295) .513 (1.043) 27.179 (4.973)
baseline 14 7.100 (3.407) 3.463 (3.987) 11.119 (5.362)
baseline 15 9.913 (5.171) .363 (.917) 24.511 (4.578)
baseline 16 8.375 (6.097) .600 (1.308) 22.519 (4.239)
baseline 17 10.150 (2.141) .438 (.869) 24.419 (2.936)
baseline 18 10.125 (5.931) 1.738 (2.249) 19.097 (5.325)
couple 19 3.263 (3.265) .375 (.848) 20.666 (2.391)
couple 20 15.688 (3.360) .238 (.601) 28.421 (2.963)
couple 21 17.625 (3.895) .038 (.191) 30.413 (3.213)
couple 22 10.750 (8.511) 4.225 (4.466) 9.577 (15.430)
couple 23 7.706 (1.950) 1.475 (1.534) 19.526 (3.542)
couple 24 15.588 (5.539) 1.650 (1.700) 22.678 (5.779)
couple 25 18.463 (4.612) .813 (2.007) 27.266 (7.559)
couple 26 18.875 (3.643) .400 (1.481) 29.584 (4.877)
couple 27 10.994 (3.820) 2.913 (3.273) 15.215 (7.223)
couple 28 8.856 (5.423) 3.088 (3.562) 13.183 (8.459)
couple 29 7.250 (5.426) 3.200 (3.395) 12.089 (9.053)
couple 30 9.988 (1.859) 1.475 (2.289) 20.524 (5.090)
couple 31 18.888 (3.163) 2.038 (2.957) 22.200 (12.079)
couple 32 9.725 (7.382) 2.100 (3.197) 17.541 (10.593)
couple 33 5.575 (1.553) 1.275 (1.902) 18.874 (4.234)
couple 34 2.781 (1.064) 2.363 (1.640) 14.053 (3.614)
couple 35 18.606 (3.066) 3.975 (5.463) 6.442 (7.518)
couple 36 5.000 (4.842) 5.000 (6.138) 1.114 (8.064)
couple 37 18.350 (2.611) .925 (1.290) 13.581 (1.997)
couple 38 16.019 (4.653) 1.275 (1.842) 11.852 (4.050)
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Treatment Group Contribution (SD) Punishment (SD) Payoff (SD)
chat 39 3.850 (3.397) .238 (.846) 21.473 (3.620)
chat 40 5.644 (2.394) 1.575 (2.061) 17.904 (5.413)
chat 41 15.294 (5.140) 1.150 (2.820) 24.297 (9.339)
chat 42 3.400 (1.811) .325 (.652) 20.958 (1.855)
chat 43 18.419 (4.448) 1.163 (3.671) 25.125 (14.674)
chat 44 12.769 (4.474) .125 (.644) 27.139 (3.889)
chat 45 16.525 (5.798) 1.288 (2.404) 24.425 (10.090)
chat 46 16.519 (5.376) 1.863 (3.575) 22.079 (14.260)
chat 47 14.256 (5.173) 2.738 (4.078) 16.873 (10.983)
chat 48 6.825 (2.278) .488 (.729) 22.318 (2.131)
chat 49 6.475 (2.544) .675 (1.868) 21.149 (6.381)
chat 50 14.975 (6.314) 1.638 (1.989) 22.117 (7.492)
chat 51 4.606 (1.588) .538 (.745) 20.899 (2.632)
chat 52 16.588 (4.950) 1.063 (1.503) 25.762 (6.908)
chat 53 10.238 (3.825) 2.500 (2.837) 16.332 (8.212)
chat 54 7.638 (2.940) 3.488 (4.704) 10.635 (11.153)
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Concluding Remarks
The work presented in this dissertation focuses on the effects that responsibil-
ity for others has on individuals in different decisional settings. It is possible
to divide the thesis into two parts: the first provides an overview of some of
the most relevant contributions to the literature, collecting the experimental
data and presenting an aggregate analysis; the second part consists of two in-
dependent experimental studies on delegated decision making under risk, and
leadership in cooperation, respectively. The literature analysis portrays a clear
and precise picture of the state of the art, while the experimental method al-
lows to disentangle specific phenomena that would be, otherwise, complicated
to observe outside a controlled environment.
Following, I summarize the main findings of the dissertation, provide an
overview of the possible implications and limitations, and suggest how the
experiments presented could be extended for future research.
5.1 Main Findings and Implications
Chapter 2 presented an analysis focused on three different decisional settings
with delegation: dictator games, delegated decision making under risk, and
leadership in cooperation.
Regarding dictator game, I summarized the exhaustive meta-analysis by
Engel (2011) and presented his main findings. Results from the analysis point
out that, on average, individuals playing a dictator game share 28.35% of their
endowment with the recipients they are paired with. A part from this, the
author stresses the importance of specific experimental factors, explaining how
these can affect dictators willingness to give.
In particular, Engel distinguishes between factors increasing the amount
given to recipients, and factors reducing dictators’ offers. Among the first, it is
possible to find the presence of multiple recipients, the fact that recipients can
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be considered deserving, old dictators, or recipients who earned their shares.
On the other hand, among the factors that affect negatively dictators’ offers,
the author recognizes the presence of more dictators who decide together,
recipients who already have a certain welfare, low degrees of social proximity
between dictators and recipients, young dictators, and repeated games.
Generalizing his findings, Engel suggests that, taking into account the
heterogeneity of results emerged from his analysis, one should consider exper-
iments on dictator games as mainly explorative, and use them to obtain more
information about the heterogeneity of individuals’ allocation preferences.
The second part of the literature analysis drove the attention to delegated
decision making under risk, corresponding to risky decisions that have con-
sequences on others’ money. Studies in this field point out various results
in terms of discrepancies between risky decision making for self and others,
which might be due to some idiosyncratic factors of the experimental settings.
Specifically, the great majority of the studies I have considered report an in-
crease in risk aversion when people decide on behalf of someone else: this
finding is clearly supported by studies adopting the BDM, and the GP task.
However, this does not always hold when other procedures are implemented.
As a matter of fact, researches relying on the use of Multiple Price Lists or on
the estimation of the Certainty Equivalent (BDM excluded) report a mixture
of results in the extent of risk-taking for others. In my analysis, it emerges how
the heterogeneity of task features might affect risk-taking: for instance, simply
plotting risk preferences on a common scale (Crosetto and Filippin, 2015), it
is possible to notice how the various tasks capture differently individual risk
preferences. Finally, I argue that it is necessary to consider individual pref-
erences as a possible determinant of the discrepancy between self and other
risk-taking.
The last part of Chapter 2 focused on leadership in cooperation. In general,
the implementation of leadership fosters contribution to the public good, and
it seems there is no evidence of any negative effect. This is true being the
leader a simple coordinator, a person advising other group members, or a
dictator. One explanation to this phenomenon could be the moral pressure
produced by responsibility for others.
However, even if leadership produces an increase in contributions in all
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the considered studies, it is still possible to identify few experimental features
affecting negatively this increase. These are altruistic punishment, the size
of groups (apart from groups with 4 members), and a number of repetitions
greater than 20.
It follows that the concluding remarks by Engel (2011) also hold in the
domains of delegated decision making and leadership in cooperation, so that,
when designing an experiment, one has to be aware of the fact that single fac-
tors could be relevant in determining decision makers’ choices; furthermore,
specific experimental settings can be used to disentangle and analyze particu-
lar human behaviors.
Chapter 3 moved the focus on delegated decision making under risk and ad-
dressed three specific research questions: i) do individuals use more resources
to offset risk when accessing others’ resources rather than own resources? ii)
Do individuals use more resources to offset risk borne by themselves rather
than by others? iii) Do individuals offset risk differently when choosing for
themselves rather than when delegated to choose for others?
The experiment designed to answer these questions allowed to manipulate
at the same time the dimensions of risk and resources. Behaviors observed in
the experiment were assessed against predictions were from the linear model
for social preferences by Charness and Rabin (2002). Although the linearity of
the model is a simplification, results provided support to its prediction power
under the experimental conditions applied .
Specifically, experimental evidence show that (i) individuals invest more
in risk protection when someone else provides the required resources, but, at
the same time, (ii) when individuals directly bear the cost of risk protection,
they invest less to protect others than to protect themselves. Furthermore,
(iii) individuals tend, when delegated to decide for others, to invest more in
risk protection than when choosing for themselves.
What seems to emerge from this experimental analysis is that differences
between investment in risk protection for the decision maker and other in-
dividuals can be largely predicted relying on their social preferences; in par-
ticular, people showing difference-averse preferences, on average, invest more
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resources in risk protection than individuals with preferences for the welfare-
enhancement. The main explanation to this, as pointed out by Linde and
Sonnemans (2012), is given by the fact that difference-averse types have a
lower utility when, in terms of payoffs, they lag behind others.
The most important implication of this study is the emerged importance
of individuals’ distributional preferences in delegated decision making under
risk. Standard self-centered utility models are not helpful in this domain, as
they do not take into account what should be the curvature of others’ utility
function. This study sets aside the problems related to the utility curvature,
focusing, instead, on other regarding concerns; this produces clear-cut predic-
tions.
Chapter 4 drove the attention to implications of leadership in cooperation,
using as experimental setting a public good game. The investigation had
the aim of understanding whether leadership is beneficial when, in addition
of being responsible for others, leaders are also asked to cooperate among
themselves. In addition to this, there was an additional treatment where
followers were allowed to communicate to leaders their opinion on the choices
made during the round just passed.
Experimental results showed that, when there is no communication, lead-
ership causes an increase in contributions to the public good, but also an
increase in the use of both altruistic punishment and antisocial punishment.
When communication with leaders is allowed, instead, results show that con-
tribution and punishment are, in general, lower, and not significantly different
from what observed in the baseline.
Regarding final payoffs, although leadership increases the average contri-
bution level, the undue use of punishment jeopardizes the benefits of this
increase. This result suggests that the responsibility for others’ payoff incen-
tivizes leaders to try to prevents other players from comprising payoffs of their
own group punishing more; but their attempt and excess of aggressiveness
generally cause a reduction of average payoffs.
In this sense, the use of communication is beneficial, as leaders seem to
perceive an alleviation of the psychological pressure of responsibility, which
helps them reduce the use of punishment, obtaining an increase in final payoffs.
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It is important to underline how, average payoffs under the communication
condition are not statistically different from the ones in the baseline.
This suggests that, in the experimental setting used, dictatorial powers, on
average, increase contributions but not payoffs; a democratic approach where
followers can express their opinions to leaders leads to higher cooperation and
efficiency, preventing a possible waste of resources deriving from psychological
pressure and individual aggressiveness.
5.2 Limitations and Further Research
Experimental economics have been mainly criticized because some consider
results obtained in the laboratory as simple indicators of real individuals’
behavior. Levitt and List (2007) explain that, despite the number of authors
utilizing the experimental approach has been growing during the last decades,
when taking part to laboratory experiments1, individuals are framed into an
artificial setting diverging from naturally-occurring environments.
On the other hand, some authors (Levin et al., 1983, and Brookshire,
Coursey, and Schulze, 1987 among the others), address results from field ex-
periments against data on individuals’ behavior obtained in laboratory exper-
iments, and report evidence of the external validity of the latter, supporting
the idea that laboratory results provide more than simple indications.
Anyway, Guala and Mittone (2005) clarify the distinction between exter-
nal validity and the robustness of phenomena observed in the laboratory. In
fact, most of the criticisms made to experimental procedures address the prob-
lem deriving from differences between an artificial environment and the real
world, without considering the robustness of phenomena observed during ex-
periments. Authors using the experimental approach has never argued that
behaviors observed in the laboratory fully correspond to people’s behavior
in everyday life; they, instead, interpret significant results as insights of the
natural human decisional process.
Once clarified this methodological issue, it is possible to focus on the limi-
tations of the single studies presented in this thesis, and to explain how further
1In particular, Levitt and List (2007) focus on experiments aimed to investigate social
preferences.
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research on the phenomena investigated could help improve and strengthen the
findings obtained.
Regarding the analysis on leadership in cooperation conducted in Chapter
2, the main limitation could be considered the fact that, in order to build the
pooled dataset starting from different studies, there was the need to normalize
all the experimental results. Together with the fact that, in meta-studies, it
is practice to analyze articles based on different experimental settings, and
aimed to investigate similar, but yet different, research questions, this can
produce general results that are not completely reliable, but provide a sufficient
overview of the state of the art in a field of literature.
In order to increase results reliability, it would be helpful to extend the
purpose of the analysis: a broader meta-study might consider experiments in-
volving public goods game in general, instead of focusing only on those imple-
menting leadership. This would allow to compare leadership (or, specifically,
different types of leadership) to other independent treatment factors affecting
cooperation.
Chapter 3 has evidenced the importance of allocation preferences in situ-
ations where individuals are delegated to make risky choices for others. Evi-
dence presented can be considered a starting point for further research in this
area; in fact, if results pointed out the predictive reliability of a pure model
for social preferences, on the other hand it is important to keep in mind that
the one used was a linear simplification. From this perspective, next studies
should try to draw the attention to the model to use to obtain behavioral
predictions, so that curvatures of individuals’ utility functions can be taken
into account.
Chapter 4 investigated the effect of leadership in a between-leaders public
good experiment, where decision makers play under strategic interaction and
are responsible for another person. Results evidence how, from an efficiency
point of view, it is better to implement leadership leaving to followers the
possibility to express their opinions. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
to allow a two-sided communication, in order to observe how leaders would
behave under that condition; in fact, it seems that when followers communicate
with leaders, the psychological pressure they have because of the sense of
responsibility for others is partly mitigated, but there may be some unobserved
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factors that could be captured from a reciprocal exchange of messages.
In addition to this, the group structure is really simple: there are couple
of players, divided into a leader and a follower. Further research should in-
vestigate how, manipulating the number of leaders and followers can affect
cooperation and efficiency in a similar experimental setting.
Although the studies described in this dissertation present some limita-
tions from a methodological point of view and can be considered preliminary
explorations, they provide precise answers to specific research questions, and
contribute to enrich the knowledge about individual decision making and so-
cially oriented behaviors, providing a starting point for further research.
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